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Housing is recognized as a basic demand of human beings .. A major 
objective of many governments is to supply its people with a reasonable 
standard of dwelling units. 
The Libyan Arab Republic like any other country is doing its best 
in this field. It has initiated and·adopted several housing programs to 
meet this objective. These various programs differ in many ways. Even 
though they were all designed to solve the same problem, they differ in 
their institutional framework, and in the way they are implemented. 
Different programs are designed to benefit members of different income 
classes. 
The main housing programs in the L.A.R. can be divided into these 
following categories. 
(1) Public housing program: under this program, the Libyan govern-
ment builds houses at pre-determined locations, and with 
standard designs. Then it gives them to the poorest people in 
the economy. 
(2) Interest free loans: under this program, the people who are 
in the income class from L.D. 50 to L.D. 99 per month1 
receive an interest free loan from the ·Real Estate and 
1Libyan Dinar $3.37. 
1 
2 
Industrial Bank, a governmental bank. To get the loans from 
the·bank, these people have to own the building lot or at 
least have an option on one to be purchased with the loan. 
These loans are paid back oyer a 20-year period. 
(3) Low interest rate loans: This program is designed to serve 
the people who earn a monthly income in excess of L.D. 100. 
Since these people are not eligible for interest free loans, 
the government designed this program to provide them with sub-
, I 
sidized loans from the commercial banks at a 4 percent interest 
rate. 
(4) Rent allowance program: Under this program, the government 
gives its employees a monthly allowance for rent. This allow-
ance is calculated as a percentage of the employee's monthly 
salary. This percentage' gets lower as the monthly salary gets 
higher, and gets higher as the monthly salary gets lower, but 
with a minimum and maximum limit. Then this allowance is just 
added to the employee's monthiy salary. The employees are not 
required to prove that they spent this allowance as a rent. In 
fact they do not even have to rent a house. 
There are other government housing programs not mentioned here, but 
they are related to one or another of these programs. These four 
programs mentioned here constitute most o-f the governmental housing 
policy. 
The Nature of the Problem 
The Libyan Arab Republic as other developing countries has had a 
housing problem for a long time. Many houses and construction buildings 
were lost during the wars, especially during the war for independence 
which lasted more than 30"years. The housing problem has become more 
acute and noticeable since 1960. 
3 
From 195~ when Libya got its independence to 1956, it was a very 
poor country, depending more heavily on foreign assistance and rent from 
foreign military bases. From 1956 to 1960 some foreign oil companies 
came, in looking for oil and spent a lot of money which generated limited 
economic prosperity and job opportunities concentrated mainly in the two 
big cities, Tripoli and Benghazi. This, of course, was a very strong 
economic incentive for the rural population, especially the labor force, 
to move to the urban areas. 
But the biggest change.in the Libyan economy started with the 
beginning of oil exportation ln 1961. Since that year oil revenue has 
accumulated rapidly. Economic activity and job opportunities grew 
rapidly year by year. The economy was transformed from a very weak and 
traditional agricultural economy to one depending more and more on the 
oil sector. 
Another result was a rapidly increasing migration from rural areas-
to urban centers. This movement had created a lot of problems in both 
urban centers and the rural areas. The most important and urgent 
problem was thought to be the housing proolem. The movement of rural 
population to urban centers is larger and faster than the urban housing 
sector can absorb. As a result, crowding 'in housing began to appear as 
a higher rate of persons per room. Slums and shanty towns increased 
every year around the two big cities. At this point, the government 
started to play its role in this field, and initiated some housing 
programs to solve the housing problem. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The main purpose of this study is to compare the t\vo main public 
housing programs, namely, interest free loans program, and the publicly-
built housing program. This study will compare these two housing pro-
grams in terms of net tenant benefits they provide to their participants, 
net tenant benefit-tenant subsidy ratio, and in the way these net tenant 
benefits are distributed according to family characteristics such as 
family income, family size, and age of the head of the family. The main 
questions that are hoped to be answered in this study are: 
(1) Do t~e two programs provide the same average monthly net tenant 
benefits and the same benefit-subsidy ratio? 
(2) How are net tenant benefits in each program related to tenant's 
actual income? 
(3) How are net tenant benefits in each program related to tenant's 
family size? 
(4) How are net tenant benefits in each program related to the 
age of the head of the tenant's family? 
The answers to these questions will shed light that will help show 
how these housing programs are working, and will provide policy makers 
with some guidelines. These guidelines will help the policy maker choose 
the right way and make the most economical decision to improve and 
increase the efficiency of these housing programs. A~though this study 
is conducted within the framework of the Libyan economy, its results will 
be applicable to such problems in any economy. 
5 
Significance of the Study 
This study is undertaken to evaluate and compare the two main hous-
ing programs in the Libyan Arab Republic, namely the publicly built 
housing program and the interest free loans program, in terms of the 
tenant benefits they provide to their tenants. It will also shed some 
light on the way these benefits are distributed according to family 
characteristics such as income, family size, and age of the head of the 
family. 
The significance of this study stems from the following reasons: 
(1) A careful and detailed review of related literature revealed 
that this study is the first one to be undertaken as far as 
evaluating public housing programs in the Libyan Arab 
Republic is concerned. 
(2) Being the first in this' area, it was thought that it ~vould 
have a lot of credit for exploring this field for further 
valuable studies. 
(3) By pointing out the tenant benefits in both programs and the 
way they are distributed according to the tenant's family 
characteristics, it will highlight the shortcomings of both 
programs so they can be adjusted and modified. 
(4) It provides the policy makers with some evaluative criteria 
that would enable them to judge housing programs and to take 
the right decision where they are needed the most. 
(5) Finally, the significance of this study is enhanced by the 
fact that these housing programs have been existing for more 
than· 10 years and it is about time to see if they are going 
in the right direction in approaching their objectives. 
Organization of the Study 
The study is organized in the following way: This chapter is an 
introductory chapter. It gives some idea about the nature of the 
problem, purpose of the study, and significance of the study. It also 
presents the questions to be answered by the study and finally the 
organization of the study. 
Chapter II deals with the economic and housing backgrounds of the 
problem. The economic background gives us a very clear picture of how 
the Libyan economy has been transformed, by oil production and exporta-
tion, from a very poor economy to a very rich one. The housing back-
ground sheds some light on the development of the housing sector from 
the time of ~ndependence up to now. It shows how housing requirements 
and housing supply were develo,ping over that period of time. It also 
gives some facts about housing problem~ such as the shortage and the 
quality problems. 
Chapter III is concerned with the housing programs and the housing 
institutions in the Libyan Arab Republic. It gives a good picture of 
these housing programs and the way they work. In addition to that, it 
shows how the institutional framework has changed after the revolution 
of September 1969. 
Chapter IV cites the important related literature and introduces 
the analytical methodology of the study. It shows how tenant benefits 
from both programs can be estimated. 
Chapter V focuses on the procedures used to collect the data, data 
analysis, and finally the results of the regression analysis. 
6 
Finally, in Chapter VI the study provides some concluding remarks 
and some guidelines or policy recommendations. 
7 
CHAPTER II 
ECONOMIC AND HOUSING BACKGROUND 
The purpose of this chapter is to present a brief outline of 
economic and housing conditions in the Libyan Arab Republic before and 
; 
after the discovery and exportation of oil. This outline will help to 
understand the reasons behind the initiation and adoption of the various 
housing programs. The chapter is divided into two main sections, the 
economic background and the housing background. Under the first section 
changes in economic conditions and economic structure will be presented. 
In the other section the discussion will be focused on the supply of 
housing, demand for housing, housing requirements and housing problems. 
Economic Background 
At the time of independence, the 24th of December, 1951, Libya was 
considered to be a typical example of an underdeveloped country. At 
that time the majority of the population.was living at a subsistence 
level. Per capita income was extremely .low, not exceeding L.D. 14, or 
$45. 
The economy was heavily dependent on a very traditional agricultural 
sector, both in terms of production and employment. Other sectors 
besides agriculture were essentially nonexistent; their contribution 
both to gross national product (GNP) and to employment was negligible. 
8 
The future of industry at that time was considered to be very 
limited as compared with agriculture. Many factors contributed to this 
assessment, for instance: 
1. Mining resources that could be used as a raw material for 
industrial production, such as coal, oil, electric power, were not 
developed or' even known to exist at that time. 
9 
2. The level of skill of the Libyan labor force was very low. The 
number of businessmen who were originally Libyan, at that time, probably 
would not exceed the number of fingers on one hand. 
3. The local market was smaller than the size of the market that 
would provide the effective demand necessary for an economic rate of 
industrial production. The smallness of the local market was due both 
to the smallness of the population, its dispersal, and to the low level 
of per capita income. 
But, the economic situation in Libya has changed completely with 
oil exportation which started in 1961. From that year on, oil revenues 
have been accumulating at a very rapid rate. In 1962 this revenue was 
L.D. million 7.2. In 1969 this figure jumped to L.D. million 275, while 
in 1973 it rose to L.D. million 646.4. Oil revenues are surely higher 
now because of the increase in oil prices. 
With these accumulated revenues the government has started a number 
of economic and social development programs. Economic activities and 
employment opportunities are both increasing at a rapid rate. Economic 
growth is rapid and incredible as Professor El-¥allakh of the University 
of Colorado said, "If the economic growth occurring today in Libya was 
to be described without identifying the country, it would be dismissed 
most likely as an extremely hypothetical case, too dramatic to be 
real. ,.l 
10 
From this statement we can imagine the important role that oil has 
played in changing the Libyan economy from one growing very slowly to 
one that is growing very rapidly. It has changed the country from a 
poor country to a rich one. GNP went up from L.D.M. 164.4 in 1962 to 
L.D.M. 1298 in 1971, and per capita income increased from L.D. 14 in 
1952 to L.D. 565.9 in 1971. It has transformed the country from a 
relatively capital-scarce country to a relatively capital-abundant one. 
The major transformation of the structure of the economy was from 
one that depended more on agriculture to an economy that depends more 
and more on oil. Both oil production and its percentage of the GNP have 
been rising every year. The relative importance of the agricultural 
sector in terms of employment and GNP has been declining over time. 
This transformation of the economy is shown clearly in Table I. The 
agricultural share of GNP has declined from 26.1 percent in 1958 to 9 
percent in 1962, and again to 3 percent in 1971. On the other hand, 
the oil share in GNP has been rising from 6.9 percent in 1958 to 23 
percent in 1962, and again to 71 percent in 1971. 
The other relevant pattern of change that came with the discovery 
and exportation of oil is unbalanced regional growth, especially in terms 
of economic activities and job opportunities. Even though there has 
been growth in economic activities and employment opportunities all over 
the country, this rate of growth has been much higher in the urban areas 
1R. El-Mallakh, "The Economics of Rapid Growth, Libya," Middle East 
Journal, Vol. 23 (1969), p. 308. 
TABLE I 
G.N.P.: ABSOLUTE AND PERCENTAGE SHARES OF AGRICULTURE SECTOR AND PETROLEUM SECTOR 
IN G.N.P. OVER THE PERIOD 1958, 1962 THROUGH 1971* 
Year 1958 1962 1963 1964 1965 · 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
G.N.P. 52.0 164.6 240.7 306.5 435.6 559.7 648.5 881.4 1043.4 1101.8 1298 
Agriculture, forestry, 13.57 14.9 15.1 16.7 25.2 27.3 30.9 33.4 37.4 34.6 32.9 
and fishing 
Percent 26.1% 9% 6% 5% 6% 5% 5% 4% 4% 3% 3% 
Petroleum~mining 3.58 38.0 99.6 195.7 270.1 356.1 402.5 648.6 754.7 812.6 920.5 
Percent 6.9% 23% 41% 64% 62% 64% 62% 74% 72% 74% 71% 
*All numbers here are at the market prices, and are in millions of Libyan Dinars. Source of data--All the 
numbers in this table are calculated from the National Accounts for the Libyan Arab Republic, 1962-1971, 
October 1972; except for the year 1958, where its numbers were taken from document No. 3 of the planning 
Documents, September, 13, 1971. 
,_.. ,_.. 
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(especially Tripoli and Benghazi) than it has in the rural areas. The 
high concentration of economic activities and governmental departments 
in these two cities can be explained by the following factors: 
1. These two cities were and still are the biggest cities in the 
country. 
2. Most of the economic activities and governmental departments 
during the colonization periods were concentrated in these two cities. 
3. Before the country was united in 1963, it was divided into 
three states, Tripolitania, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan. Tripoli and 
Benghazi were capitals of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica states, which also 
made them the centers of most economic activities. 
4. Because of the existence of public facilities and infra-
structure such as buildings, roads, ports, and others that were left in 
these two cities from the colonization time, they were picked up as the 
best places for the government and business activifies. 
5. The geographic and economic advantages that gave them economic 
importance were access to the cost and export markets, a large labor 
force, ports, airports, and roads. All of these factors have made them 
the best locations for most economic activities, which, in turn, in-
creased their economics of agglomeration, which, in turn, increase their 
chance of growth over time. 
This concentration of economic:activities in urban areas (especially 
Tripoli and Benghazi) left the agricultural labor force in an increas-
ingly disadvantageous situation over time. Push factors (in terms of 
low wages and high rates of unemployment) in the agricultural sector 
worked hand in hand with pull factors in the big urban centers (such as 
high wages and low rate of unemployment) to attract a large segment of 
13 
the population from the agricultural sector and the rural areas to the 
urban areas. The population of Tripoli increased from 264,000 in 1954 
to 406,000 in 1964, and to 709,000 in 1973. The population of Benghazi 
increased from 134,000 in 1954 to 225,000 in 1964 and to 331,000 in 
1973. 2 Net migration to both Tripoli and Benghazi from independence 
3 to 1964 amounted to 92,451 persons. 
In addition to internal migration, the exportation of oil and the 
intensive concentration of economic activities that accompanied it 
resulted in a large inflow of migrants from neighboring countries, 
especially Egypt and Tunisia. Some of these migrants were, in fact, 
Libyans returning to the country after they had migrated because of the 
war. But many of them, especially in the·last five to six years, were 
just workers seeking employment in Libya, or were entered by the Libyan 
government or the private sector to help in implementing the development 
programs and projects. Although no official data are available on this 
process, there are some rough estimates of it. For,instance, the number 
of migrants into the country (return and non-return migrants) was 
estimated to be about 54,000 persons during the period 1951 to 1963 4 ·and 
2 
The numbers for 1954 and 1964 were taken from the Statistical 
Abstract, 1970, p. 10. The numbers for 1973 were taken from the draft 
copy of the Ph.D. dissertation made by A. 0. Toboli, Oklahoma State 
University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, 1976. Note that these numbers rep-
resent the population of Tripoli and Benghazi regions, and not Tripoli 
and Benghazi cities. 
3Ministry of Planning and Development, Public Administration for 
Economic and Social Affairs, Department of Regional Planning, Geographi-
cal Distribution of Economic Activities (Tripoli, June, 1968); p. 5. 
4Government of Kingdom of Libya, Ministry of Planning and Develop-
ment, Housing in Libya, Vol. 1, Existing Conditions and Housing in 
Libya, Vol. II, Problems, Policies, ••• Programs (Athens, 1964), p. 269. 
·' 
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about 69,000 persons during the period 1964 to 1968. 5 
This migration to the urban centers was larger and faster than the 
housing sector in those centers could readily absorb. Because of this 
and some other factors discussed later, housing problems were and still 
are serious. The housing situation even though much better than it was 
10 or 15 years ago, still requires a lot of work and effort for improve-
ment as will be seen in the following sections where the housing situa-
tion is described. 
Housing Background 
The Housing Situation 
The housing situation in Libya, as in most underdeveloped countries, 
is characterized quantiatively and qualitatively by an utter inadequacy 
for which demographic and socioeconomic factors are responsible. This 
was, in general, true in Libya before the discovery and exportation of 
oil. However, after the discovery of oil and especially after its 
exportatio~, Libyan housing problems became more spatially concentrated. 
They became more acute in the urban areas than in the rural areas. 
Those problems had been accumulating over time as is clear from the 
increasing number of shanty towns around the urban centers. The 
provision of adequate housing is among the more difficult goals that the 
Libyan government has to achieve. T.o better understand the housing 
situation, information about housing requirements, demand for housing, 
5Libyan Arab Republic, Public Administration for Social and 
Economic Planning, Economic Survey for the Libyan Arab Republic, 1964-
1968 (Tripoli, 1971), p. 32. 
·IS 
supply of housing, and housing problems will be explored and studied 
before any examination of housing programs. 
The housing situation can be explained by Figure 1, where the price 
of housing (Ph) is on the vertical axes and housing services (H) are on 
the horizontal axes. DD represents the demand for housing, SS represents 
the supply of housing, and the vertical line Hq represents housing 
requirements. 6 In Figure 1 the market quantity of housing (H1) is not 
as large as housing requirements (Hq), which results in a housing short-
age (as defined here). Keep in mind that the word shortage is used to 
refer to an excess of housing requirements over the market quantity of 
housing rather than to refer to an excess of quantity demanded over the 
quantity supplied resulting from a price of housing lower than the 
equilibrium price. In graphical te,rms\ the word shortage (as used here) 
refers to the quantity H1Hq. 
Due to many factors both demand for housing and housing require-
ments increased. Some.of these factors have increased demand more than 
requirements, others have increased requirements more than demand, and 
. 
still others have increased both demand and requirements by an equal 
amount. For these reasons the discussion of demand and requirements 
in the next section will be unable to separate the two concepts with 
precision. 
The effects of an increase in demand and an increase in require-
ments on the price of housing and the housing shortage depend on the 
elasticity of the long run supply of housing. Suppose the demand for 
6By ·housing requirements it is meant, .. houses that are required in 
order for every family to have a house of its own. It has nothing to do 
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housing increased as is shown in Figure 1 by the upward shift in the 
demand curve from DD to D'D', and housing requirements increased from 
OHq to OHq'. What effects will these increases have on the price of 
housing and housing shortage? As indicated above, the effects depend 
on the elasticity of the supply of housing. If the supply of housing 
is infinitely elastic as can be represented by the horizontal line 
(Ph1S') in Figure 1, then these increases in demand and requirements 
will have no effect on the price of housing, and will reduce the short-
7 age from H1Hq to HqHq'. If the supply of housing is less than 
infinitely elastic as can be represented by SS in Figure 1, then the 
price of housing will go up from Ph1 to Ph2 , and the shortage of housing 
will increase.from H1Hq to H2Hq'. 8 
Due to many factors discussed later the long run supply of housing 
in the Libyan Arab Republic is thought to be less than infinitely price 
elastic. 
Housing Demand and Housing Requirements 
After Libya obtained independence in 1951, a large number of people 
who had migrated to neighboring countries (Egypt and Tunisia) because of 
the war started to return. Most of these return migrants settled in 
Tripoli and Benghazi. This migration, plus the loss of an estimated· 
10 percent of the housing stock during the war resulted in relatively 
7Noti~e here that we have the increase in demand more than the in-
crease in requirements. But if the increase in requirements was greater 
than the increase in demand, the shortage will be more than before. 
8once again, whether shortage increases, decreases, or stays the 
same depends on whether the increase in demand is less than, more than, 
or equal to the increase in housing requirements. 
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scarce housing. A shortage of housing began to appear in the housing 
market, especially in the urban areas. Effective demand was not suf-
ficient to entice much additional supply. With economic conditions 
getting as bad as they were in Libya at that time, good housing was a 
luxury good. 'Who is going to pay for adequate housing when he is not 
even able to get something to eat? So the excess of housing require-
ments over housing supplies continued to grow. It has been intensified 
and aggravated by many factors that made it continue to grow even after 
14 years of oil exportation and the accumulation of revenue. These 
.factors are: 
1. Foreign aid and revenue from military bases--Shortly after 
independence, foreign aid and revenue from foreign military bases 
started to improve economic conditions. They injected some money into 
the Libyan economy. Per capita income and wages began to increase in 
the urban areas where these military bases were located. Labor was 
attracted from the rural areas which, combined with military personnel 
and foreign experts and advisors, contributed to increased housing 
demand and housing requirements. 
2. Search for oil--By 1956, the search for oil by foreign oil 
companies began. The number of oil companies and the number of foreign 
workers and employees with these companies has grown, increasing housing 
demand and housing requirements. 
3. Oil exportation--With oil exportation, revenues to the govern-
ment began to accumulate, and the government started large development 
projects. Those projects required a large number of skilled and semi-
skilled laborers. Most of this labor came from abroad. Again housing 
demand increased, but housing requirements increased more because the 
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semi-skilled foreign workers probably did not have sufficient purchasing 
power to purchase adequate housing. 
4. Increased oil production--Because of increases in oil produc-
tion, per capita income has increased tremendously, which, in turn, 
increased the demand for replacing substandard dwelling units. Again 
housing demand and housing requirements increased. 
5. Increased income--Due to the increases in income, educational 
level and modernization of life, the number of persons per household 
decreased, and the number of families increased, which increased housing 
requirements. 
6. High rate of population growth--Even though the population of 
Libya is very small compared to most of the other countries in the world, 
its rate of growth is very high. The growth rate (as shown by population 
censuses of 1964 and 1973) was 3.7 percent during the period 1955 to 1964, 
and 4.1 percent during the period 1964 to 1973. A high rate of popula-
tion growth implies a high rate of growth of housing requirements. 
7. Government policy--The other factor that has contributed to the 
increase in housing requirements in Libya is government housing policy. 
These housing programs have increased requirements in many indirect ways 
such as: 
a. They require that every family, in order to be able to get a 
publicly built house or an interest free loan, has to prove that it does 
not have a house, and that its income does not exceed a certain level. 
The problem with this requirement is that it is very hard to prove that 
the information shown in the application is right or wrong. Thus, many 
tricks have been played by some people. Some families, even though they 
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have a hous~. register that house under the name of one member of the 
family and apply for a publicly built house or interest free loan under 
the name of another member. With respect to the level of income 
reported, it is very hard to prove that it is lower than the family's 
actual·income, especially for the families who are engaged in a free 
enterprise job and not as a public employee. It seems that there are 
some families who got either houses or loans but actually were not 
eligible for them. 
b. The easiness of terms for getting a publicly built house or 
loans from the Real Estate and Industrial Bank has discouraged private 
investments in housing. Many people started to direct their savings to 
other things such as automobiles, televisions, more clothes, going 
abroad for trips, etc. They do not worry about improved housing because 
they think that they can (and probably can) get it if they just submit 
an application ·for either a house or a loan and wait for a while. They 
think that it is the government's responsibility to house them. It is 
not unusual to find some people in Libya who own one or two trucks but 
do not have a decent house, and who are either waiting for a house or 
an interest free loan. The person is eligible as long as he does not 
have a house and his reported incotne is within the required limits. 
Because of all these factors, housing·requirements have been in-
creasing very rapidly as can be seen from the estimates presented in the 
following discussion. 
Estimation of Housing Requirements 
There are at least two methods available to estimate housing 
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requirements. 9 The first method is based on the relationship between 
the number of households and the number of houses. It assumes that 
every household, if it so desires, should be entitled to its own house. 
:,. . 
The problem with this method is that it does not indicate the distribu-
tion of these housing units by the numb.er of rooms. 
The second method of estimating housing requirements is based pri-
marily on the relationship between the number of persons and the number 
of rooms. But even though this method avoids may pitfalls, and despite 
the fact that it is more appropriate, it has some disadvantages. The 
most important one is the difficulty of satisfying the generally accepted 
standard that ·each household should have its own dwelling unit if it so 
desires. 
For this study there have been some estimates of housing require-
ments in the Libyan Arab Republic at different periods of time. These 
estimates were based on the first method of estimation discussed above. 
According to those estimates, housing requirements in 1964 were 251,450 
h i . 10 ous ng un1.ts. In 1971, they were 216,590 housing units, 11 and in 
12 1973, the number was 203,800 housing units. And for the period 1976 
to 1985, housing requirements were estimated to be 286,000 housing 
units. 13 These estimates included the estimates of the following 
9united Nations, Housing for Africa (New York, 1965), p. 109. 
101. b . Arab R bl" Mi i t f Pl . Th Y Pl 1. yan epu 1.c, n s ry o ann1.ng, ree ~ ~' 
Proposal (Tripoli, 1972), p. 195 (in Arabic). 
11Ibid., p. 195. 
12Libyan Arab Republic, Ministry of Planning, Some Comments on 
Housing (Tripoli, 1973), pp. 2-4 (in Arabic). 
13Libyan Arab Republic, Ministry of Planning and Scientific Re-
search, Five Year Plan, Proposal (Tripoli, 1975), p. 6 (in Arabic). 
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housing requirements: 
1. housing required for the increase in families due to increase 
in population, 
2. housing required for replacement of dilapidated housing and 
unsuitable houses, 
3. housing required to reduce crowding, and 
4. houses required to house the migrants. 
Supply of Housing 
The data on the supply of housing in Libya during the period 1952 
to 1964 ia not available yearly. According to a housing study con-
ducted in 1964, the shortage in housing at the end of that year was 
estimated to be 118,504 units. It was estimated that 70,200 units were 
required to house the families that were living in slums, tents, and 
caves. To replace dilapidated houses, 36,000 units were required, and 
12,304 were required to meet the irtcrease in the number of families due 
14 to the increase in population. 
In the period 1964 to 1972, only 45,000 housing units were built, 
with an annual average of 5,600 housing units. Twenty-one thousand were 
built by the public sector, and 24,000 were built by the private 
sector, either from their own savings or with loans from the Industrial 
and Real Estate Bank or from other commercial banks. 15 
14 . 
Government of Kingdom of Libya, Ministry of Planning and Develop-
ment, Housing in Libya, Vol. I, Existing Conditions and Housing in Libya, 
Vol. II;Problems, Policies, ••• Programs (Athens, 1964), pp. 266-269. 
15Libyan Arab Republic, Office of Prime Minister, Voice of Students 
Studying Abroad, Vol. 20 (September, 1970), p. 4 (in Arabic). 
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For the period 1972 to 1975, the thl;"ee-year development plan showed 
that the government aimed to build 80,000 housing units in path the 
private and the public sector. According to this plan, this number was 
assumed to meet the annual requirements during the p'lan, provide for 
the increasing number of families, and allOY7 the substitution of new for 
torn down old houses, which alone was estimated at 35,000 housing units . 
. The remaining 45,000 housing units '"ere planned to help in overcoming 
the housing shortage. As a result, it was expected that the accumulat-
ing deficit in housing would drop during the plan period from 190,000 
housing units (in both the stable and unstable sectors of the popula-
tion) at the end of the year 1971-72 to about 145,.000 housing units at 
the end of 1975. 
With regard to the period 1976 to 1985, the new plan estimated 
that housing requirements during this period will be around 286,000 
housing units and they expect that this will be met by building 123,000 
units during the first five years and 163,000 units during the last five 
years. We can see that even if this plan succeeds in the accomplishment 
of what was planned, the housing shortages will not be solved until 
1985. 
The supply of housing in Libya has not been able to grow faster 
than housing requirements or even as fast bec'ause: 
1. Immediately after independence, construction activity was very 
badly constrained by the financial resources in the country. 
2. The availability of bu{lding materials and the industries that 
produce them in Libya can be summarized in the follo~ing characterihics: 
a. The production of local materials, in general, is inadequate to 
meet the local demand. 
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b. The production and consumption of key building materials, such 
as cement, wood, and iron, are unbalanced. Cement, for example, is 
only 40 percent supplied from the local production. It is not the un-
availability o£ the raw materials necessary to produce cement, but rather 
the low capacity of the already existing factories which causes the 
limited local production. 
c. Industries that can produce electrical equipment, sheet glass, 
or hardwood essentially do not exist. 
d. The cost of local prod~ction is relatively high due to factors 
such as the scarcity of large scale operations, lack of technical and 
managerial skills, lack of skilled labor, lack of cheap and efficient 
transportation systems and so forth. 
3. Most of the house designs and styles in Libya are western 
and highly dependent on the use of imported materials. 
4. Because of the dependence of the housing industry in Libya on 
the imported materials, delays in the provision of these materials delay 
construction. The delay is intensified by the low capacity of the local 
ports. 
5. Due to demand pressures and increases in population in the 
cities, price of land and the b~ilding materials increased, increasing 
the price of housing very rapidly. In 1954, for example, the cost of 
building a house of two rooms and facilities was estimated to be from 
350 to 400 Libyan Dinars. The same house now costs at least 4,000 
Libyan Dinars, which means the housing costs have increased 10 times 
within 21 years. In effect, the long-run supply of housing is very 
inelastic. 
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6. Another limiting factor is that the old streets in both 
Benghazi and Tripoli, as in any old city, are very narrow. They could 
not efficiently handle heavy traffic. When the government widened these 
streets, the widening process resulted in the destruction of many homes. 
7. Slum clearance programs have also reduced the housing s~ock. 
8. T~e use of some buildings, that were originally built for hous-
ing for non-housing purposes (such as using them as government depart-
ments or offices) had contributed to increase the gap between housing 
requirements and the supply of housing. 
9. The other factor that, in my opinion, had contributed to the 
shortage problem can be called a house hunt. The way that the house 
' hunt process had developed in Libya can be explained as follows: When 
' the government decided to clear the slum areas and to give the people 
wh.o used to live there houses or build them new ones, some people found 
their golden chance to get a house. Some members of the family, usually 
old members would just build a slum in the slum area and wait for a new 
house. This process had increased the number of slum houses every year. 
Due to these factors and probably some others, we find that housing 
in Libya is still predicted to remain less than required, and that the 
long-run supply i~ thought to be less than infinitely price elastic. 
Housing Problems 
The Shortage Problem 
It is clear from the previous analysis that the housing market in 
Libya is suffering from a very acute shortage in the number of houses 
I 
compared to the requirements of them. As it was shown earlier, this 
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problem is not really new to the Libyan housing market. But the strange 
thing about this problem is that it seems to be intensifying every year, 
especially during the period that followed the discovery and exportation 
of oil. 
As sho~ ~arlier the housing shortage has been evident for a long 
time in Libya, and it is still continuing to grow. It was estimated to 
be around 145,000 units by the end of 1975. The shortage problem can 
be explained by comparing the number of households to the number of 
houses that are available, or the ratio of households to the dwelling 
units combined with the average number of persons per room. 
For the country as a whole, the density rate in 1963 was estimated 
to be 1.37 families per house or dwelling unit. This rate was obtained 
by estimating that the population of Libya in 1963 was 1,162,000 and 
that the average number of pe~sons per household was 4.8 persons. 
had resulted in 280,000 families which were living in approximately 
189,000 housing units. According to this estimate, one out of four 
families would have no house of its own. 
This 
According to the 1973 census the number of households was 386,048, 
and the number of housing units was 345,836 which will result in a 
shortage of 40,212 units. If we add the slums and tents of about 
73,255, and add the housing units that need to be replaced which, if 
estimated as 5 percent of housing stock, will come to more than 17,000 
units, and add the number of housing units required to solve the crowding 
problem, 40,212 units, the shortage in houses will be 130,000 units. 
Even if these numbers were correct, and all the housing units were of 
standard condition, we still have a density ratio of about 1.11 families 
per housing unit, which is not a low ratio. 
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Additional information is available for Tripoli and Benghazi. A 
1962 budget survey summarized in Table II shows that the situation in 
Benghazi was a little bit better than it was in Tripoli. The average 
number of rooms per household in Benghazi was 3.2, while in Tripoli it 
was 2.6. Also, the average number of persons per room indicates that 
the people in Benghazi are enjoying more housing services (assuming that 
the housing quality and the preferences of the people are the same) 
than the people in Tripoli. The figure for Benghazi was 1.93 percent 
16 persons per room, and in Tripoli, it was 2.2 persons per room. 
From another budget survey in Tripoli, taken in 1962, one discovers 
that the average size of the household was 5.3 persons. For almost half 
17 of the sample group, the density per room was as high as four persons. 
From all these numbers we can see how tough the shortage problem in the 
housing market is. 
The Quality Problem 
The shortage problem is not the only one in the Libyan housing 
sector. The other important one is the quality problem. By the quality 
problem it is meant that not all of the available housing units are in 
good standard condition. Some of these dwelling units are occupied just 
because there is nothing better ava~lable. A considerable number of 
them are just slums and shanties. A high percentage of them do not have 
all or even some of the necessary facilities such as piped water, 
16Libyan Arab Republic, Ministry of Planning, Census and Statistical 
Department, Statistical Abstract (Tripoli, 1970), p. 72. 
17Rawle Farley, Planning for Development in Libya: the Exceptional 
















DISTRIBUTION OF HOUSEHOLDS AND THEIR NUMBERS BY SIZE OF THE HOUSEHOLD AND TOTAL 
NUMBER OF ROOMS, AVERAGE NUMBER OF ROOMS PER HOUSEHOLD, AND AVERAGE NUMBER 
OF PERSONS PER ROOM FOR VARIOUS SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD 
Number of Number of Number of Average No. of Average No. of 
Households Persons Rooms Rooms :eer Family Persons :eer Room 
Tripoli Benghazi Tripoli Benghazi Tripoli Benghazi Tripoli Benghazi Tripoli Benghazi 
24 23 24 23 38 38 0.6 1.7 0.6 0.61 
75 48 150 96 125 116 1.7 2.4 1.2 0.83 
83 . 46 249 138 179 141 2.2 3.1 1.4 0.98 
72 60 288 240 197 172 2.7 2.9 1.5 1. 40 
106 71 530 355 252 197 2.4 2.8 2.1 1. 80 
106 71 636. 426 278 227 2.6 3.2 2.3 1. 88 
96 55 672 385 282 171 2.9 3.1 2.4 2.25 
72 53 576 424 231 193 3.2 3.6 2.5 2.20 
47 44 .423 396 135 158 3.3 3.6 2.8 2.51 
37 36 370 360 120 152 3.2 4.2 3.1 2.37 
41 46 515 576 149 208 3.6 4.5 3.5 2.76 
759 553 4,433 3,417 2,004 1, 773 2.6 3. 2 . 2.2 1. 93 




electricity, sewage system and so on. The following data for 1964 
provides some indication of housing quality in Libya. In 1964 (as can 
be seen in Table III) only three percent of the total families lived 
in villas or apartments, 52 percent lived in houses, 21 percent in 
shanties, 20 percent in tents, 3 percent in caves, and 1 percent not 
stated. At least 45 percent of the Libyan families in 1964 lived in 
substandard housing units. 
Many housing units do not have complete facilities. For instance, 
as seen in Table IV, 34 percent of the dwelling units in cities over 
20,000 were not supplied with piped water in 1963. Sixty-seven percent 
were not connected with sewage system. Twenty-five percent of these 
dwelling units were not supplied with electricity. This situation is 
much worse with respect to the smaller size cities, villages, and farms 
as can be seen in Table IV. Ninety-three percent of the dwelling units 
in villages were not supplied with piped water, 99 percent were not con-
nected to sewage system, and 83.5 percent were not supplied with 
1 . . 18 e ectr1c1ty. 
With respect to Tripoli, the 1962 socioeconomic survey on 288 
households showed that 36 percent of these households did not have 
electricity in their homes and 33 percent did not have piped water. 
The following information is available from a socio-economic survey 
in Benghazi taken in 1970. Six percen~ of the housing units in the 
sample were not connected with electricity, 32 percent did not have 
18The numbers in Table IV are for 1963, and may not represent what 
is going on in Libya now. Since 1963 is only the third year in oil 
exportation, housing in Libya, on the basis of my personal knowled~e, 
has improved. Data are not available to demonstrate it. 
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TABLE I.II 
FAMILY HOUSEHOLDS BY SIZE AND TYPE OF DWELLING--1964 
Ty:ee of Dwelling 
Villa Total 
Household or Not Family 
Size Flat House Shanties Tent Cave Stated Households 
1 845 9,014 5,880 3,011 724 529 20,003 
2 1,824 23,865 11,665 8,933 1, 718 523 48,528 
3 1,936 25,954 11,995 10,467 1,929 492 52' 773 
I 
4 1,936 26,618 ll,723 10,408 1,861 467 53,040 
5 1,354 24,759 10,161 9,647 1,674 314 47,909 
6 831 20,966 7,996 7,865 1,291 241 39,190 
7 512 15,622 5,245 6,090 941 157 28,567 
8 375 10,301 2,975 4,049 579 88 18,367 
9 252 6,351 1,451 2,186 219 44 10,503 
10 & Over 424 8,347 1,151 2,862 250 76 13,110 
TOTAL 10,316 171,797 70,242 65,518 11,186 2,931 331,990 
Source: Libyan Arab Republic, Ministry of Planning, Census and 
Statistical Department, Statistical Abstract, 1970, p. 31. 
19 baths, and 3 percent did not have a private tap. 
TABLE IV 
TYPE OF POPULATION SETTLEMENT AND PROVISION 
OF FACILITIES--1963 
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Housing Unit Not 
Supplied With 
Piped Water 




Housing Unit Not 
Supplied With 
Electricity 
Type of Settlement % % 
Cities over 20,000 
population 34 67 25 
Towns 5,000 to 




Source: Farley Rawle, Planning for Development in Libya, the Exceptional 
Economy in the Developing World, Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1971, 
p. 60. 
With regard to small towns, there was a socio-economic survey about 
Agedabia, a small town, which may give us a clear picture about other 
small towns. According to that survey, 64 percent of the houses in 
Agedabia (in 1968) were without bath tubs or showers, 17 percent of them 
19Dr. S. Mukerji and A. Kataifi, "Socio-Economic Survey in 
Benghazi," The Libyan Economic and Business Review, Vol. VI, No. 2 
(1970), p. 80. 
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were without bathrooms altogether, 40 percent of these houses were not 
connected with electricity, 95 percent did not have piped water, and 85 
20 percent were without private gardens. 
Other Problems 
I 
There are some other problems facing the housing sector in the 
Libyan Arab Republic besides the shortage and quality problems. These 
problems can be· summarized in the lack of adequate and efficient 
planning for growing cities and towns, lack of technical personnel and 
skilled labor, and the unstable sector of the population. 
Summary 
This chapter presented a brief outline of economic and housing 
conditions in the Libyan Arab Republicbefore and after the discovery 
and exportation of oil. From this outline the following conclusions 
can be drawn: 
1. The exportation of oil has transformed the Libyan economy from 
one depending on agriculture to one depending on oil. 
2. Due to the oil exportation, and to the concentration of 
economic activities in the urban areas (main1y Tripoli and Benghazi) 
there has been a large migration into these urban areas both from abroad 
and from the rural areas. 
3. Due to many factors discussed, the supply of housing (especially 
in the urban areas) has not been able to grow as fast as housing 
20Althahir Abdujalil, "A Socio-Economic Survey of Agedabia," The 
Libyan Economic and Business Review, Vol. IV, .No. 1 (Spring, 1968), p. 
86 (in Arabic). 
requirements; hence, a housing shortage has existed for a long time. 
4. Besides the shortage problem~ the Libyan housing sector also 
suffered from poor quality of housing units during the period that 
preceeded oil exportation. 
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CHAPTER III 
HOUSING PROGRAMS AND HOUSING 
INSTITUTIONS 
When housing problems started to appear and accumulate very rapidly 
in the housing market (especially in the urban areas) the government 
decided to do something about them. It initiated and adopted various 
housing policies and programs. For the period that preceded oil expor-
tations, the government's financial ability was very limited and 
severely constrained by the backwardness of the economy and lack of 
natural resources that could be used at that time. There were also some 
top priority economic problems that had to be solved before the housing 
problems, such as low level of infrastructure, education, health, and 
unemployment. All these circumstances had forced housing problems to be 
far down the list of priorities, both in the distribution of government's 
attention and. public investment. So the government's activity in the 
housing sector was very limited and could hardly be recogniz~d. It 
started a housing project in 1954 which resulted in building 464 housing 
units in Tripoli, 262 units scattered in five towns in Cyre~ica, and 120 
units in Wadi Caam in Elkhoms. At the same time it also started a slum 
clearance program in Tripoli city, where a shanty town west of the city 
d d . h b" 1 d . . bl . 1 was torn own an 1n a 1tants were resett e 1n a more su1ta e s1te. 
1The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The 
Economic Development of Libya (Baltimore, 1960), p. 294. 
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These housing activities were neither well planned nor large enough to 
ease housing problems. In fact, they may have enhanced it. The new 
site of the slum clearance program, in just a few years turned out to be 
more slummy than the first one. The small number of houses that were 
built in Tripoli and Benghazi did more harm to the housing problem than 
benefit. They increased the demand for public housing more than they 
added to the supply. They probably strengthened the variables that 
' 
encouraged rural-urban migration. 
With oil exportation in 1961, government revenue from that natural 
resource began to accumulate very rapidly over time, and its financial 
constraintbecame less severe. With those financial resources in its 
hand the government felt that it could and should take more productive 
actions toward the national problems. Since that time, housing problems 
increasingly have gained mor.e attention and financial resources. The 
government had initiated much stronger and larger housing programs. 
Housing, financial and construction institutions have been created and 
encouraged very strongly. New housing policies, besides the revision 
of old ones, have been adopted as frequently as possible. 
In 1965, for example, the government started a very large housing 
project called the "IDRIS Housing Project." According to this project, 
100,000 housing units, costing approximately L.D. 400,000,000 were to be 
built. Sixty percent of these housing units were planned to be destined 
in rural areas, while 40 percent would be in the urban areas. 2 In 1965 
also the government established the Industrial and Real Estate Bank 
Zwilliam·c. Wedley, "Progress and Problems in the Economic Develop-
ment of Libya," Libyan Economy and Business Review, Vol. IV, No. 1 
(1968), p. 31. 
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mainly to grant loans to the industrial and construction activities at 
a very low interest rate. But in a few years the.government had decided 
to cancel the interest charges and give loans free of interest. Around 
1964, the government initiated what could be called a "rent allowance" to 
its employees to help them in renting houses. 
After the revolution on September 1, 1969, the housing policies 
were adjusted. Some new housing institutions were introduced. Some new 
. housing programs were adopted and still some others have been enlarged, 
eliminated, or adjusted as can be seen in the follmving sections when 
we deal mainly with these housing programs separately and try to·show 
how they developed over time in order to give a clear picture of the 
role that has been played by the government in this field. 
The housing programs in the Libyan Arab Republic can be put under 
the following headings: 
1. Publicly built housing program (or programs), 
2. Interest free loans program (or programs), 
3. Low interest rate loans program (or programs), 
4. Rent allowance program. 
Publicly Built Housing Program 
This program was mainly designed to help the people whose incomes 
are very limited and noticeably low; people who are living in shanty 
towns and slum areas. The government thought that for these people, if 
left without help, their housing needs probabl~ will not be met by the 
private housing sector. It was thought that the best way to solve 
these people's housing problems was to set up a public housing institu-
tion to build and finance housing projects for them. So according to 
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this program, the government through its specific institution has to 
find the suitable land, finance, contract, and follow up the building 
process and so on. When the housing units are ready, they are 
distributed to those people according to a spe~ified list of priorities. 
They were distributed either for rent or for ownership on easy terms in 
both cases. If it is for rent, then the rent will be set up according 
to some variables such as family income, family size, number of rooms, 
and age of the head of the family, but the rent of these houses is 
usually very low. If it is for ownership, then the percentage of the 
cost that has to be paid by the tenant also will vary according to some 
I 
variables as income, and fami~y size. The low income people pay as low 
as 10 percent of the total cost. 
The first project of thi~ sort was started in 1965, under the name 
of IDRID Housing Project. 3 As was .mentioned before, 100,000 housing 
units costing approximately L.D. 400,000,000 were planned to be built. 
Sixty percent of these housing units were planned for the rural areas. 
of the country and 40 percent were for the urban areas. The govern-
( 
mental institution responsible for the project up to 1969 was the 
Ministry of Public Works. Even though a lot of money was spent on the 
program from 1965 to 1969, and even though there was a lot of propaganda 
about it, all the available data about this project showed that not more 
than 15,000 housing units were built during the five-year period before 
the revolution. In fact, not even all of them were completely ready 
before the revolution. That project consisted of two different types of 
3rt was under the name of the ex..-king of Libya. 
housing units or housing projects, the popular housing project or the 
economic housing project, and the middle or average housing project. 
The first kind of housing units were really designed for low income 
people and the people who were.living in shanty towns. From 1965 to 
1969, the project established 11,553 housing units of this type. With 
respect to the average or middle housing project, 3,332 housing units 
were built during that same period. Besides the fact that this number 
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of housing units was much less than was needed, most of them, especially 
the economic housing type, were just slums after only one year of their 
occupation because they were badly constructed. Most of them are just 
two room houses, and very few of them had three rooms or more. The 
middle or average project houses were reasonable, but there were not many 
and most of them were not given to the people who were in big need of 
them. 
Since the revolution the instituti·onal framework of the publicly 
built housing program has changed. It is now planned, organized and set 
up by three different organizations or institutions. The three institu-
tions are the Ministry of Housing, Housing Control Department, and the 
General Housing Corporation. 
The Ministry of Housing generally determines the housing policies, 
such as the number of houses to be built, where they are going to be 
built, etc. The General Housing Corporation is in charge of finding the 
ways of building these housing units. It usually arranges the con-
tracts, follows up the building process, checks all housing units when 
they are ready for the availability of all the amenities and public 
facilities that were specified in the contracts. It also handles the 
engineering process and all the payments to the contractors. When all 
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these processes are completed and the housing units are ready, the 
General Housing Corporation hands them over to the Housing Control 
Department. 
Housing Control Department is the institution that handles the 
distribution of the publicly built houses to the people who need them . 
. It receives the applications from the people, puts them in files, 
and when it receives some housing units, it distributes them to eligible 
applicants, following the rule first come, first served after the 
applicant has satisfied the required conditions to be eligible for these 
houses. These conditions are: 
1. He has to be from the low income class. He is required to bring 
a document to show his income. 
2. He has to prove that he does not have a house, and has not 
received a interest-free loan from the Industrial and Real Estate Bank. 
3. He has to bring certificate to show the size of his family. 
To see how this program has been working, and how it has developed 
since the revolution, reports about the General Housing Corporation and 
its activities in this field are thought to be the best way. 
The General Housing Corporation was established on December 17, 
1970. It was held responsible to do its best to overcome the housing 
problems in the country. It has two objectives. 4 
1. The first objective was to complete all the government obliga-
tions remaining from the popular housing project. Concerning this 
objective it paid L.D. 2,000,000 (unpaid money to the contractors), and 
4 General Housing Corporation, A Brief Report on the Housing Move-
ment in Libya (Tripoli, 1974), p. 1 (in Arabic). 
completed 4,770 housing units of the 8,000 housing units planned for 
the average or middle housing project started in 1966, at a cost of 
L.D. 35,000,000. 
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2;' The second obje~tive was to implement new housing programs or 
projects that the corporation either planned or participated in planning 
such as the emergent housing program, the public housing program, the 
investment housing program, and Sebha housing program. All of these 
housing programs or projects were set up after the establishment of the 
housing corporation and are explained below. 
The following tables (V and VI) show what the general housing 
corporation has done since it has been established. The corporation 
started the emergent housing project in 1970 and completed it in 1973. 
The number of housing units built in that project was 928 at a cost of 
L.D. 3,214,000. 
The corporation started the public housing project around the mid-
dle of 1971. The total number of'housing units that were contracted to 
be built within that project was 48,648 at a total cost of L.D. 
418,000,000. Bec~use of it• size, it was thought that it would be 
better if it was accomplished in four different stages, starting in 1971 
and·ending in 1975. In the following table (Table V), the number of 
housing units contracted and received,in each year during this period 
are shown. 
With regard to the investment housing project, the corporation 
contracted 2,096 housing units to be built in tajora town in Tripoli 
and in Benghazi city, with all its'amenities and facilities included in 
the contracts. The total cost of those housing units was L.D. 
35,178,180. This project was going to be'financed by the Public 
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Corporatiori for Sbcial Security. There were also 432 housirig units 
contract~d to be built in Benghazi at a cost of.L.D. 8,020,108 includ-
ing all of the amenities and facilities. These units were going to be 
financed by the Industrial and Real Estate Bank. Sebha housing project 
includes 10,000 housing units that have to be built in and around Sebha 
city. The corporation contracted 8,626 housing units at a total cost 








NUMBER OF HOUSING UNITS CONTRACTED AND RECEIVED FROM 
THE PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECT EACH YEAR DURING 
THE PERIOD 1971-1975 
Date of Number Housing Number Housing 
Contract Units Contracted Units Received 
1971/72 10,828 9,544 
1972/73 19 '513 15,538 
1973/74 14,748. 2,907 
1974/75 3,559 
48,648 
Source: General Housing Corporation, A Brief Report on Housing Movement 
in Libya. 
Besides building and following up the building process of the pub-
licly built houses, the General Housing Corporation has been very active 
in providing or contracting somebody to provide the necessary public 
facilities to these housing projects (see the following table). 
TABLE VI 
VALUES OF AMENITIES AND PUBLIC FACILITES CONTRACTED 
BY THE GENERAL HOUSING CORPORATtON 
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Amenities and Public Facilities Value in L.D. 
A. and F. for average or middle H.P. 1,590,000 
A. and F. for emergent H.P. 769,000 
A. and F. for industrial H.P. 1,336,000 
A. and F. for public H..P. 8,436,600 
A. and F. for Sebha H.P. 7,250,000 
Completion of public housing and public 12,000,000 
facilities 
TOTAL 31,381,600 
Source: General Housing Corporation, A Brief Report on Housing Movement 
in Libya. 
We can see from this analysis that the General Housing Corporation 
has played a very important role in the development of the housing sector 
both in building housing units and in the provision of amenities and 
public facilities. The total number of housing units that were con-
tracted by the General Housing Corporation was 71,509 at a total cost 
of L.D. 665,472,000. 
Besides these activities the Corporation provides a lot of public 
services to the other departments of the government especially to the 
Department of Education, Health and Transportation ... It does most of 
the contracts concerning the establishment of schools, hospitals, roads, 
and other services. 
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Comparing the development of the publicly built housing program 
before and after the revolution it is clear from Table VII that this 
program has been growing much faster since the revolution than before 
it. In terms of the number of houses contracted or built we find that 
71,509 housing units contracted or built in period of four or five 
years after the revolution while·this number before the revolution was 
14,885. It 'also can be demonstrated that this program had received 
more attention from the revolutionary government than from the previous 
government, as can be seen from the devotion of much larger amounts of 
money than before. It can probably be argued that some of the increase 
in the amount of money spent on this program is just one indication of 
inflation rather than an indication of increase in production. This is 
true but it does not mean that all the increase in costs was to pay for 
inflation because even though costs increased by 13 times, production 
increased by five times, and it is argued that the quality of the 
publicly built houses after the revolution is much higher than it was 
before the revolution. 
Interest Free Loans Program 
This housing program is completely financed by the Industrial and 
Real Estate Bank, which was established in September, 1965. 5 The main 
purposes behind its establishment wer~ to improve the financial 
resources available to the housing sector, especially for the people 
whose monthly incomes are in the range of L.D. 50 to L.D. 99, and to 
5 ' 
Industrial and Real Estate Bank, Board of Directors Report on the 
Period September 1965, March 1970 (Tripoli, 1971), p. 7. 
TABLE VII 
COMPARISONS OF PUBLICLY BUILT HOUSING PROGRAMS 
BEFORE AND AFTER THE REVOLUTION 
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No. of Housing No. of Housing 
Name of the Program 
Popular Housing 
Program 
Average or Middle 
Housing Program 
TOTAL 












First Stage of 
Janzor Electric Plant 
TOTAL 
Units in Contract Costs 





































Source: General Housing Corporation, A Brief Report on Housing Move-
ment in Libya. 
encourage the establishment of small industries by granting middle and 
long-term interest free loans. 
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The establishment of the bank was a very important opportunity for 
the low inco~e.people, especially after the government had decided that 
there would be no interest charges on the loans granted by this bank. 
Before that decision the bank used to take from 1.5 percent to 3 percent 
interest charges. This bank gave the people an opportunity to either 
upgrade their ~xisting houses or to build new ones. But before the 
revolution only the people who were in high positions in the government 
or who were related to them could get those loans. In fact, very few 
loans were given to the people who really needed them. The majority of 
the people did not have an equal chance. Some people had to wait probably 
as long as two years to get a loan. After the revolution the role of 
this bank was enlarged. The bank was ordered to forget the old applica-
tions and receive new applications and to give more attention to the low 
income people and the people who ~id not have houses. The revolutionary 
government has been paying more attention to the bank every year by 
putting more financial resources under its disposal. As we can see from 
Table VIII the bank has been growing very fast in the last few years. 
It has been opening branches frequently all over the country. Its loans 
have been growing in number and in value, and ar.e becoming more evenly 
distributed both among people and regions. 
The following conditions have to be satisfied before the loan 
will be granted: 
1. The applicant should prove that he does not own a house either 
under his name or the name of his wife or a son. 




















DISTRIBUTION OF LOANS ACCORDING TO SHORT AND LONG TERMS 
1966 TO 1972 
From 8 to 10 Years 11 Years or More 
No. Value No. Value 
166 696,083 869 3,557,818 
147 605,380 842 3,354,958 
225 800,690 57-Q 2,168,504 
179 576,654 824 3,027,870 
101 206,250 2,827 9,504,060 
49 115,380 4,613 15,990,038 
867 3,000,437 10,545 37,603,248 





















which means priority should be given to the low income people. But I 
have heard lately that this income level was increased to L.D. 150 in 
order to have more people benefiting from these loans. 
3. The applicant has to. prove that he or she is married or is 
responsible for a family, because loans are supposed to be given to 
families. 
4. The applicant must provide the land needed for the house him-
self. That is because the bank does not want to interfere in the land 
business in order not to affect 
. . 6 1.ts pr1.ces. 
5. Loans are granted only for construction and not for commercial 
purposes., 
6. In order to avoid speculation in resale of homes provided by 
the bank loans, the bank requires that the house should be mortgaged 
to the bank, and cannot be sold unless all the loan is repaid. 
7. The amortization periods of the loans range from 7 to 10 years 
for small loans, and from 11 to 20 years for longer term loans. 
8. The maximum amount of the loan originally could not exceed L.D. 
5,000, but this was raised to L.D. 6,000 and then to L.D. 7,000 because 
of the continuous increase in construction costs. 
The repayments of the loans start after one year from receiving 
the whole loan, and the monthly payments are fixed and take into con-
sideration the tenant's income, family size, and the total value of the 
loan. 
To see the housing activities that have been provided by this bank 
6There are some exceptional cases where the loan was for both buy 
ing the land and building the house (especially before the revolution) 
but these cases are very few. 
and the very important contribution that it has already given to the 
housing sector to help solve its problems, the following two tables 
give good pictures as to what this bank had done. 
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From Tables VIII and IX it is clear that the Industrial and Real 
Estate Bank has contributed a lot to the housing sector. From 1966 up 
to 1972' it granted a total number of loans of 13,361 with a total value 
of L.D. 45,771,668. Both the number and values of loans have been 
growing very rapidly over time, but as could be seen, most of the growth 
has been in the years following the revolution. In the three years 
before the revolution, the annual average number of loans was 1,303, and 
the average value of 'these loans was L. D. 4, 846,346 while during the 
three years after the revolution those averages were 3,151, and L.D. 
10,410,837 respectively. 
With respect to the regional distribution of those loans, it is 
clear from Table IX that it is becoming even more over time. The share 
of these loans that went to regions other than Tripoli and Benghazi 
has been increasing from about 7 percent in 1966/67 to 25 percent in 
1969/70 up to 31 percent in 1972/73. 
According to a declaration made by the general manager of the 
Industrial and Real Estate Bank to Alfager Algadid Newspaper, the Bank 
had granted during the period 1966 up to 31st of July 1975 a total 
of 32,000 loans for real estate and 709 loans for industry, and the 
total value of all these loans was 141.5 million of Libyan Dinars. He 
also said that the bank is now building 1,294 housing units in both 
Tripoli and Benghazi cities at a total cost of L.D. 22,207,979, which 
TABLE IX 
DISTRIBUTION OF REAL ESTATE LOANS AMONG REGIONS FROM 1966 TO 1973 
1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1970/71 1971/72 1972/73 Total 
Regions No. Value ·No. Value No. Value No. Value No. Value No. Value No. Value No. Value 
Tripoli 548 2,000,001 634 2,327,089 332 1,115,661 418 1,040,518 1,063 3,042,740 2,025 6,514,898 2,185 7,843,000 7,205 23,883,907 
Benghazi_ 940 3,588,063 417 1,728,095 385 1,504,237 617 2,,678, 750 1,562 5,238,080 1,710 5·,865,050 2,067 7,022,000 7,698 27,624,275 
Zowya 50 144,200 133 404,890 61 194,191 116 313,400 245 751,280 427 1,441,240 392 1,481,000 1,424 4,730,201 
,. 
Gerian 4 10,000 36 110,560 43 136,720 79 206,600 124 396~350 150 518,690 275 1,054,000 711 1,088,390 
Misreta 2 14,.000 8 33,000 1 3,200 2 12,500 13 47,000 78 288,690 161 690,000 265 1,088,390 
Alkhoms 5 . 18,600 8 19,000 12 38,&50 15 43,000. 51 169,250 132 467,400 199 771,000 422 1,526,900 
Gehle Akdar 35 143,500 62 211,250 82 297,200 85 272,750 14 48,300 141 529,100 386 1,740,000 805 3,242,100 
De rna - 10 39,600 13 83,000 23 110,500 17 58,900 109 297,575 162 620,500 268 1,195,000 602 2,405,375 
Alkalige 9 29,400 19 74,000 9 25,350 27 90,600 9 28,500 25 96,600 176 763,000 274 1,112,850 
Sebha 1 3,000 2 7,000 25 118,500 7 33,500 17 72,450 12 48,300 58 246,000 122 528 .. 750 
TOTAL 1,604 5,990,364 1,332 5,004,584 973 3,544,209 1,383 4,705,518 3,207 10,091,525 4,862 16,390,468 6,167 22,810,000 . 19,528 68,581,668 
Source: Industrial and Real Estate Bank, Council Board Report (in Arabic), through 1970-72, Table No. 




are going to be completed by the end of 1977. 7 
Low Interest Rate Loans Program 
This program was mainly initiated to help the people whose monthly 
incomes are in excess of L.D. 100 because they are not eligible for 
interest free loans from the Industrial and Real Estate Bank. The com-
mercial banks were asked by the government to grant loans to those 
people for the purpose of helping them build houses at a rate of 
interest of 4 percent and with a maximum amount of L.D. 6,500. 
This program started around the end of 1965, but it has been grow-
ing very fast especially during the last,three to four years. The allow-
ances for this program have been increased four times during just one 
year (from October 1, 1973 to December 31, 1974). First it was in-
creased from 40 million Libyan Dinars to 60 million Libyan Dinars, then 
to 80, and finally to 100 million Dinars. The maximum amount of the 
loan was also increased from L.D. 6,500 to L.D. 8,500 then to L.D. 
10,500 and finally to 12,000 L.D. if the loan includes the price of the 
land needed. 8 
The number of loans that have been granted from all the commercial 
banks for this purpose and their values from 1965 up to September 1974 
are presented in Table X. From the analysis of the table, the total 
number of loans has grown from 701 in 1965 up.to 4,491 by the end of 
September 1974, their value also has grown from L.D. 5,413,000 up to 
L.D. 118,697,000 during the same period. 
', 
7 
Alfager Algad:l..d Newspaper (November 13, 1975, No. 996), p. 1. 
8MASRAF ALGUMHOURIA, The Annual Report of ~ Board of Directors 
for the Period, October 1973 to December 1974 (Tripoli, 1974), p. 31. 
TABLE X 
NUMBER AND VALUE OF REAL ESTATE LOANS GRANTED BY THE 
COMMERCIAL BANKS DURING THE PERIOD 
1965 TO SEPTEMBER 1974 
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At the end of Number of Loans Value of Loans in L.D. 
1965 701 5,413,000 
1966 878 8, 891,000 
1967 1,021 10,773,000 
1968 1,296 13,092,000 
1969 1,068 15,562,000. 
1970 642 16,690,000 
1971 690 18,791,000 
March 1972 887 17,679,000 
June 1972 836 18,495,000 
September 1972 909 20,494,000 
December 1972 1,292 23,954,000 
March 1973 1,400 28,887,000 
June 1973 1,898 34,538,000 
September 1973 3,546 49,062,000 
December 1973 2,438 55,156,000 
March 1974 2,820 72,431,000 
June 1974 3,798 78,706,000 
September 1974 4,491 118,697,000 
Source: Central Bank of Libya, Economic Bulletin, January, March 1975,. 
Vol. 15, Statistical Tables, Table No. 12. 
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For the purpose of comparing the development of these loans and 
their values before and after the revolution it is clear from Table X 
that both the number and value of loans has been growing much faster 
after the revolution than before it. Up to 1969 the number of these 
loans was 1,068, with an annual average of 214; while during the five 
years after the revolution this number went up to 4,491, with an in-
crease of 3,423 loans or at an annual average of 685 loans. With 
respect to the value of these loans, we find that it increased from L.D. 
15,562,000 before the revolution 'up to L.D. 118,697,000 with an increase 
of L.D. 103,135,000; or at an annual average of L.D. 20,627,000. 
But we have to keep in mind that in the last three to four years 
these loans were not just loans to the middle income class, but rather 
included the loans for housing corporations that were established since 
December 1973, and the loans for developing construction of commercial 
housing. 
In December 1973, the government announced that housing corpora-
tions should be initiated, and that they will be helped by granting them 
loans at a very low rate of in,terest (2 percent), and in finding land 
for their members. These housing corporations are supposed to help 
their members in (1) getting the required money, (2) buying the land, 
(3) getting building materials at reasonable prices, (4) handling the 
building process, (S) receiving the houses from the contractors and 
giving them to their owners, and (6) managing the houses after they are 
ready in such things as collecting the monthly payments, maintaining 
the buildings, and providing the needed repairs for sewage, electricity, 
water pipes and others. 
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Also around 1973, the government announced that low interest rate 
loans would be available through the commercial banks for every one who 
wants to participate in solving the housing problems by building multi-
house buildings for rent, under the condition that each building has to 
contain four suites or·more. Those loans were granted at 5.5 percent 
interest rate and for a period of 10 years. Both of these events have 
contributed to the increase in both the number and the value of low 
interest rate loans program. 
Rent Allowance Program 
This program was initiated in 1964, and it was mainly for the 
government employees. According to this program every government 
employee regardless of his jo'b is entitled to a rent subsidy or rent 
allowance. This subsidy' is a percent of the employee's monthly salary. 
It was put in a way that this percentage gets higher as the monthly 
salary gets lower and vice versa. It ranges from 28 percent to 35 per-
cent for unmarried, and from 56 percent to 100 percent for the married 
employees, with a minimum of L.D. 20 and a maximum of L.D. 43 for 
9 
unmarried and L.D. 35 and L.D. 94 for the married employees. 
Even though this program was. really helpful during the early period 
of its establishment, its value has been depreciated a lot because of 
high increases in rent especially in the last few years. Because of 
this increase in rent, it can hardly be said that government employees 
are in better housing conditions than before this program. They still 
9Libyan Arab Republic, Ministry of Planning, Studies on Housing 
in L.A.R. (Tripoli, May, 1974), p. ,38. 
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need help in this field, either by increasing this subsidy or by build~ 
ing houses for them. 
Summary 
These are the housing programs in the Libyan Arab Republic. We 
have seen how these programs have been developing over time, and how 
each of them has been working to solve housing problems. From these 
housing programs only the publicly built housing program and the 
interest free loans program are going to be analyzed in terms of net 
tenant benefits that they provide to their tenants and in the way these 
benefits are distributed according to family characteristics such as 
income, family size, and age of the head of the family. These two 
programs are considered to be the most important because in terms of 
the theory of consumer choice, they have different effects. Under the 
publicly built housing program the participant has no freedom to select 
his housing services, while under the interest free loans program he is 
free to choose. The other housing programs do not have significant 
distinguishing effects and can be classified as similar to the publicly 
built housing program or to the interest free loans program. 
The next chapter, in addition to citing the most important 
literature about housing programs in general, ~ill show us how these 
two programs are related to consumer theory and develop the theoretical 
background to estimate net tenant benefits from these programs in order 
to be able to evaluate and compare them. 
CHAPTER IV 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Public housing programs have attracted the attention of economists 
for quite a lone time. There have been a lot of studies analyzing, 
identifying, and sometimes trying to measure the benefits and costs of 
public housing programs. Some studies have been completely devoted to 
the analysis and measurement of the direct benefits to yublic housing 
tenants; in other words, these studies were mainly concerned with the 
increase in tenants' welfare as a result of having the opportunity to 
consume a bundle of goods that could not be attained with their 
1 
unsubsidized budget constraints. Other studies have looked only to 
indirect effe.cts such as the impact of public housing programs on 
. 2 property values. There are still some other studies that are mainly 
1R. L. Bish, "The Distribution of Housing Taxes and Subsidies and 
Effects on Housing Consumption of Low Income Families" (unpub. Ph.D. 
dissertation, Indiana State University, 1968). M. P. Murray, "An Econo-
metric Analysis of Tenant Benefits in Alternative Federal Housing 
Programs" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Iowa State University, 1974). R. 
Muth, Public Housing, An Economic Evaluation, American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research ·(Washington, D. C., 1973). E. 0. 
Olsen, "A Welfare Economic Evaluation of Public Housing" (unpub. Ph.D. 
dissertation, Rice University, 1968). J. R. Prescott and E. 0. Olsen, 
An Analysis of Alternative Measures of Tenant Benefits of Government 
Hous.ing Programs (Santa Monica, 1969). J. R. Prescott, "The Economics 
of Public Housing: A Normative Approach" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, 
Harvard University, 1964). 
2H. Nourse, "The Effects of Public Housing on Property Values in 
St. Louis," Land Economics, 39 (1963), pp. 434-441. 
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3 concentrated on the cost side of public housing programs. 
This study is another effort on the direct benefit side of the 
public housing programs. Its purpose, as mentioned before, is mainly 
to compare the two main housing programs in the L.A.R.; namely, the 
publicly built housing program and the interest free loans program. 
The comparison will be in terms of the direct benefits they provide to 
their tenants and in the way these benefits are distributed according 
to the family characteristics in each program. This chapter will shed 
some light on the theoretical basis of these government programs. The 
characteristics of these programs will be discussed in some detail. 
Also the way they can be related to the consumer theory and their 
effects on consumer choice will be explained. Finally, the definition 
of the tenants' benefits and a method of their estimation will be 
introduced in this chapter. 
The Characteristics of Public 
Housing Programs 
Most of the public housing programs are subsidies in kind and not 
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in cash. That means the government either provides the goods directly, 
or helps the people get better access to the goods. They take different 
forms and serve different groups of the population. 
Subsidies in kind have been subject to several general criticisms. 
3F. DeLeeuw, "The Section 23 Leasillg Program," The Economics of 
Federal Subsidy Programs, Part~, Housing Subsidies, A compendium of 
papers submitted to the Joint Economics Committee of the Congress of the 
United States (Washington, D. C., 1975). R. Muth, Public Housing, An 
Economic Evaluation, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research (Washington, D. C., 1973). 
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Many economists have argued that the recipients of a subsidy in kind 
would be hetter off if they were given this subsidy in cash, given that 
both ways of giving the subsidy will result in the same cost to the 
government. While this seems to be undoubtedly correct, some recent 
studies have showed that this might not always be the case, and they 
4 
emphasized that donors may have the opposite preference. J. M. 
Buchanan in his article, "What Kind of Redistribution do We Want?", 
finds the use of consumer sovereignty to derive allocative norms 
inconsistent with the choice of social welfare functions to express 
distributional objectives. 5 Henry J. Aaron and George M. Von 
Furstenberg said, "If redistribution is a public good for transferors 
and not merely the result of coercion or 'taking' the preferences of 
donors help determine both the extent and the form of redistribution." 
They said, "Once interdependence of preferences is introduced and 
donors, though altruistic, are not indifferent to the recipient's 
spending pattern, Pareto-optimal redistribution can take forms other 
6 
than cash." 
The main criticism that was directed to subsidies in kind is their 
"inefficiency." But Aaron and Furstenburg in their article, "The Inef-
ficiency of Transfers in Kind: The Case of Housing Assistance," found 
4G. G. Daly and S. F. Giertz, "Efficient and Inefficient Transfers," 
paper presented at the Meeting.of the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences (Boston, 1969). E. 0. Olsen, "A Normative Theory of Transfers," 
Public Choice, 6 (Spring, 1969), pp. 39-58. 
5J. M. Buchanan, "What Kind of Redistribution do We Want?", 
Economica, 35 (May, 1968), pp. 185-190. 
6 Henry J. Aaron and George M. Von Furstenberg, "The Inefficiency of 
Transfers in Kind: The Case for Housing Assistance," Western Economic 
Journal, 9 (1971), p. 184. 
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out that inefficiencies in housing assistance is very small, and most of 
it can be explained by the administrative cost side of these housing 
programs. 
The other justifications for public housing programs are the non-
competitiveness of the market, the existence of externalities which 
cannot be internalized by purely individualistic action, and paternal-
is tic a'ltruism. With respect to the competitiveness of the market, 
Edgar 0. Olsen had analyzed all the conditions of competition in the 
housing market and concluded that there is no empirical evidence to 
support the noncompetitiveness argument. He said, 
Until an alternative theory of the housing market is developed 
which leads to an economic model that has more explanatory 
power than Muth's model, perfect competition is the best 
theory of the housing market available.7 
With regard to the Libyan housing market there is no reason to 
believe that it is not competitive. Ownership of houses is not con-
centrated in the hands of a few people. The rent market also is not 
dominated by a single or few people or firms. From the supply side 
point of view, the Libyan housing market is highly competitive. There 
is no single firm or few firms that can be said has (have) a substantial 
influence on either the price or the quantity of housing services 
supplied. 
With respect to the externalities argument or what sometimes is 
called "so~ial costs of slums," there are many studies which used this 
argument as their base to justify public housing. In fact, even the 
phrase itself has had various meanings in the literature depending on 
7 - . 
Edgar 0. Olsen, "A Welfare Economic Evaluation of Public Housing" 
(unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University, 1968), p. 33. 
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the background of the writer. Probably, with only a few exceptions, the 
examples of social costs of slum living that were given in the literature 
cannot be considered as justification for public action in the sense of 
Paretian welfare economics, because the costs are incurred by the 
decision-making unit which has a complete control over the quantity of 
housing services consumed. 8 If the consumer of the substandard housing 
is the only one who is going to benefit from the improvement in his· 
housing, then there will be no externality involved. 
Some empirical studies infer causation from housing to physical, 
mental, and social disorders from simple correlation between two vari-
9 ables without appeal to theory. The usual approach that is followed by 
these studies is to compare the incidence of physical, mental and 
social disorders by census tract with the characteristics of housing 
conditions in the tract. As an example, consider the case of housing 
and juvenile delinquency that was illustrated by the study of Bernard 
'· 
Lander. He found that "the juvenile delinquency rate is highly cor-
related with substandard housing and with residential overcrowding with 
partial correlation rates of r = +.69 and +.73 respectively."10 But 
when Olsen eliminated the influence of some other variables studied, he 
found that "these correlation rates were reduced to +.0052 and .0079. 
8The exception is Jerome Rothenberg, Economic Evaluation of Urban 
Renewal (Washington, D. C., 1967) ,. Chapter X. 
9Jay Rumney, "The Social Costs of Slums," The Journal of Social 
Issues, VII (1951), pp. 77-79, Surveys the results of a number of these 
studies, Wilner et al., The Housing Environment and Family Life, Chapter 
I is an excellent short review of the better studies in this field. 
10 
Bernard Lander, Towards an Understanding of Juvenile Delinquency 
(New York, 1954),·p. 46. 
Furthermore, wheR adjustment was made for the curvilinearity of the 
d h 1 . h 11 11 ata, t ese partial corre ations are reduced 1n bot cases to zero. 
Still other studies stress the benefits that will occur from the 
improvement of housing conditions for low income families. They said 
that these benefits will be in the form of better health, reduction in 
fire incidence, and a lower crime rate. Probably the best example for 
12 these.studies is the study by Rothenburg. 
John C. Weicher, in a study trying to measure the effects of the 
Hyde Parkkenwood Urban Renewal Project on the municipal expenditures 
on some public services, found that the reduction in the expenditures 
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on these services ranges from 2 .percent to 15 percent of project costs. 
Based on his results he said: 
When the r~sults of the present study are evaluated in con-
junction with those of Rothenberg., Mao, and Ferrara, it 
appears that economic justification for urban renewal 
projects depends heavily'upon their effects on the phenomena 
of slum-generated social costs (crime, fires, disease, and 
personality difficulties), which have so far been unmeasur-
able.l3 
Considering these social costs of slums, Edgar 0. Olsen said: 
With respect to the tangible benefits that occur to some indi-
viduals from the improved housing of others, it is not the 
quantity of housing service consumed by others which directly 
enters the preference functions of the indirectly benefitted 
individuals. Rather, it is their own consumption of health, 
fire protection, and police protection which the indirectly 
benefi~ted individuals value • • • The quantity of housing 
11Edgar 0. Olsen, "A Welfare Economic Evaluation of Public Housing" 
(unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University, 1968), p. 40. 
12Jerome Rothenberg, Economic Evaluation of Urban Renewal (Wash-
ington, D. C., 1967), Chapter X. 
13 
John C. Weicher, "The Effects of Urban Renewal on Municipal 
Service Expenditures," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 80, No. 1 
(January, February, 1972), pp. 86-H)O. 
services consumed by low-income families enters the prefer-
ence functions of high-income families as one of many inputs 
in the production of final goods. So high income families 
for which this is the case will have a derived demand for 
housing service for low-income families . • . But, besides 
the existence of this demand it should be of sufficient 
magnitude so that high-income families place a value on the 
consumption of an additional unit of housing service by a 
low-income family beyond what the low-income family would 
consume in the absence of the collective action . • • So, 
to make a ·case for housing subsidies to low-income 
families on the above grounds, it must be shown that high-
income families will benefit from the consumption of housing 
service by low-income families beyond what these families 
would consume in the absence of the ~ollective action. 14 
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With respect to the third justification, "Paternalistic Altruism," 
Olsen said that, "It is probably the primary motivation of active sup-
porters of public housing." What is meant by an altruistic person here 
is the person who is willing to give up some goods in order to make 
other people happier because he prefers the added well-being of others 
to the goods that he could have' purcha'sed. To him well-being of others 
is a good, the quantity demanded of it (as any other good) depends on its 
price, income, and his tastes. So the optimal amount of transfers 
justified by the altruism of individuals does not depend on the recip-
ients needs alone, but also on the prices to, incomes and tastes of the 
givers. 
But, suppose that altruism justifies transfers between individuals. 
How can it justify a subsidy in kind such as public housing? To answer 
this question, Olsen said that: 
Some altruistic people prefer to give subsidy in kind rather 
that in cash even though they realize that the recipient would 
be better off with the cash. If this is the case, then a sub-
sidy in kind is the correct program even though the recipient 
14 
Edgar 0. Olsen, p. 41. 
would have been better off with the cash. More real-
istically, the donors may feel that the recipients would be 
better off with the subsidy in kind than with the cash, 
even though the recipients themselves would choose the cash 
of the donors instead of the housing service. This attitude 
on the part of the donor is commonly called paternalism. In 
the case of public housing, the nature of the recipients 
might seem to strengthen the argument for paternalism. Their 
lack of education probably means not only that they are un-
productive but. also less efficient maximizers within their 
limited budget constraints. Paternalism does seem to be a 
major aspect of reality. In real life we observe that most 
charitable organizations give aid in kind rather than in 
cash. If altruistic persons are paternalistic too, then 
transfer programs should reflect this fact. If this paternal-
istic altruism involves a desire for low-income families to 
consume more shousing services, then, we can safely say that 
these altruists have a demand for housing services for low-
income households. Since there are many people who place 
some value on the increased consumption of housing service 
by low-income households, then it is a collective good, and 
we cannot depend on the individualistic action operating 
through the market to produce the correct amount of housing 
services for poor families.l5 
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From this analysis we can conclude that the most reasonable justif-
ication for public housing is·the "paternalistic altruism." It seems 
that this conclusion holds for the·public housing programs in the Libyan 
Arab Republic because: (1) the non-competitiveness of the market argument 
will not hold as mentioned before because of the deconcentration of 
houses ownership; (2) even though there is no empirical analysis of the 
externalities associated with slum housing in Libya, the improvement 
in the housing conditions of the poor does not seem to generate enough 
external benefits to justify the public housing programs. 
The Effect of Housing Programs 
on Consumer Choice 
Housing programs will directly affect a consumer's choice from the 
Ibid., p. 46. 
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set of goods and services that are available to him, and the relative 
prices of these goods and services. From the point of view of the 
participant in the housing programs, these programs give him the 
opportunity to obtain housing at a lower rental outlay than if he were 
to purchase the same housing services on the open market. As can be 
seen from the real life, housing programs can provide different kinds 
of subsidies to attain this purpose. But the important point is how 
these programs can be classified in terms of the theory of consumer 
choice. 
Following DeSalvo's classification, two types of housing programs 
. 16 
can be recognized. 
Type I Housing Program: In this type of housing program, the con-
sumer has a free choice in the selection of housing services, design, 
location and so forth. The interest free loans program in the L.A.R. 
can be classified under this type of housing program. The participants 
in this program have the freedom of selecting the design, location, num-
her of rooms, and so on. There is no government interference with the 
consumer choice except for the assurance that the loan has been spent on 
the house. 
Type II Housing Program: Under this type of housing program, the 
consumer has no freedom to choose. He has to live in the house that is 
specified and determined by the housing authority, or otherwise not 
participate in the housing program. In other words, the participant in 
the housing program has to accept what is offered by the housing 
16 . 
J. DeSalvo, "A Methodology for Evaluating Housing Programs," 
Journal of Regional Science, 11 (1971), pp. 173-185. 
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authority if he wants to be a participant. He cannot select the type of 
house he wants or its location. The publicly built housing program in 
the L.A.R. could be easily.classified under this type of housing 
program. Under this program the housing authority in the L.A.R. 
chooses the location, specifies the design, builds the houses, and then 
offers them to the needy families at a below market rent without giving 
the individual consumer the freedom to choose. 
To see the effects of.type I housing program on the participant, 
consider Figure 2. In this figure, the individual consumer is con-
fronted with the budget line with ·the equation Y = P X + PhH (shown as X . 
r 1 in Figure 2). Where Y represents the consumer fixed income, P is the X 
fixed price of the composite nonhousing good X, and Ph is the fixed 
price of the composite housing good H. 
If there is no housing program, and the consumer is facing free 
market conditions, he will be maximizing his utility at the point A, 
where his indifference curve u1 is just tangent to his budget line I 1 , 
ending up buying ox1 units of other goods and OH1 units of housing, 
which will require rent of r 1 = PhH1 • Next, suppose that the consumer 
is a participant in a housing program that enables him to get housing 
at less than market rent. For example, assume that a housing unit 
which commands a market rent equal to r = PhH, is offered to the 
participant in the housing program only for ar where 0 < a < 1. 
According to this assumption, the consumer will be facing a new 
budget line with an equation Y = P X + aPhH (shown in the figure as the 
X 
line I 2). The maximum utility point in this case will be point B where 
the indifference curve u2 and the budget line I 2 are tangent to each 
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Figure 2. Model of Consumer Choice and Participation in Type I 
Housing Program 
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housing and ox2 units of other goods. It can be noticed that since a 
is less than 1, the budget line rotates out to the ri~ht. The result 
of this reduction in the prices of housing to the participant is making 
him better off, by helping him reach a higher indifference curve u2 , 
consuming a higher quantity of housing H2 , and paying only aPhH2 for 
them which ~s less than PhH2 , the amount he would pay if he purchased 
the quantity at the market price. 
The Effect of Type II Housing Program 
As was mentioned before, under this type of housing program, the 
participant does not have the choice of selecting the type of housing 
he wishes, neither does he have the choice of selecting the location 
or the design. In fact, he either accepts the type of housing that is 
offered to him by the housing authority or does not participate in the 
program at all. 
To see what kind of impact this type of housing program has on 
its participants, consider Figure 3. The vertical line at H2 represents 
the fixed amount of housing the tenant must purchase under this type 
of housing program. The tenant will pay for this quantity of housing 
the amount of aPhH2 , where, as in type I housing program, 0 < a < 1. If 
instead he were to buy this quantity on the housing market he would 
have to pay the amount PhH2 (which is greater than aPhH2 , since a< 1). 
Before participating in the program the consumer's budget line is 
represented by I 1 in Figure 3. He maximizes his utility at point a 
(the tangency point of his budget line I 1 and his indifference curve 




Figure 3. Model of Consumer Choice and Participation in 
Type II Housing Program 
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units of housing. If he participates in this housing program, his 
,budget line will be I 2 • Assuming that H2 units of housing have to be 
purchased, and aPhH2 has to be paid for it as a rent, the participant 
will end up with the combination of H2 of housing and x2 of other 
goods. 
If the consumer was free to choose along the budget line I 2 , he 
would have chosen point (b), where he could enjoy a higher level of 
utility (U3). He could do that by giving up some housing to be traded 
for some of the other goods X. It has to be clear here that drawing 
the vertical line at H2 was arbitrarily. It could be drawn in such a 
way that the participant would end up at the same point (b) which is 
his choice ,at , the free market. A,lso, it might be drawn in such a way 
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that H2 would be so low, that the participant would be willing to trade 
off some units of the composite good (x) for some units of housing (H). 
A f 1 · G h MRS 1.·s > Ph and 1.·n th1.·s case the s or examp e at po1.nt w ere H,x p 
X 
consumer will be willing to trade off some x's for more housing. It can 
even be possible to choose the quantity H2 so large, that the 
participant would be worse off with the program than without it. What 
has been shown in Figure 3 is probably the most realistic case. It 
showed that the participant has to purchase more housing units than he 
prefers at prices P and aPh, but not enough for him to prefer not to 
X 
participate. 
Tenant Benefits from Housing Programs 
It was explained above that housing programs help their tenants 
reach a higher level of utility than was possible for them .. before the 
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participation in these housing programs. In other words housing 
programs really do benefit their tenants or participants. The most 
important point here is how these tenant benefits can possibly be 
assessed or measured. One possible way is to find the amount of money 
that will make the consumer as well off without the program as with it. 
There are several ways to do this, all of them are based on the notion 
of consumer's surplus. Some studies have used the Marshallian measure 
of consumer's surplus, or other measures which can be viewed as good 
approximations to the Marshallian measure, such as the difference 
between the tenants pre-participation rent and his program rent, or the 
difference between the market rent of the subsidized unit and the 
17 
subsidized rent or the program rent. Other studies have used the 
price equivalent variation version of Hicksian measure. 18 
Marshall defined consumer's surplus as the excess of the price 
which the consumer would be willing to pay rather than go without the 
thing over what he actually pays for that thing. According to him this 
excess would be equal to the area under the demand curve to the left of 
the quantity purchased, minus the payment for the commodity (subject.to 
the important assumption that the marginal utility of money be constant). 
This measure assumes that the quantity of the commodity picked up 
by the consumer will be represented by a point on the consumer's demand 
curve. But in some housing programs this quantity is specified by the 
housing authority (not by the consumer) and there is no assurance that 
17see the studies made by Michael P. Murray, Edgar 0. Olsen, and 
James R. Prescott, Bish and others. 
18see the studies made by Henry J. Aaron and George M. Van 
Furstenberg, Joseph S~ DeSalvo and others. 
this quantity will be a point on the consumer's demand curve. 
According to Murray, 
Marshall's measure, then purports to be the amount of money 
we could take from a person to leave him no better off .than 
he was prior to entering the program. This measure is, in 
itself, uninteresting from a policy point of view, because 
there is no interest in' 'taxing' participants in this 
fashion. However, the Marshallian measure would be of 
interest if it offered a reliable, simple approximation of 
a more policy oriented benefit measure.l9 
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According to the Hicksian measure of consumer's surplus, the direct 
tenant benefits would be defined as the increase in income that if given 
to the consumer in the absence of the housing program will make him as 
20 
well off as the program does. This study will use this version of the 
Hicksian measure because the Marshallian measure is often criticized on 
the following grounds. 
1. It is criticized on the assumption of constant marginal util-
ity of money. 
2. It is not as robust as the Hicksian measure in cases off the 
demand curve. 
On the other hand, the Hicksian measure was supported because of 
~any reasons, such as: 
1. It tells us in an intuitively appealing way how much better 
off participants are made. 
2. It tells us how much it would cost to improve the lot of 
tenants just as much as the program does, if we were to forego affecting 
their consumption pattern. 
19 
M. P. Murray, p. 19. 
20This is what is called price equivalent variation version of con-
sumer's su·rplus measures. 
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3. It allows us to compare the participants' actual consumption of 
housing with what they would consume if given an equivalent cash 
21 grant. 
This measure has been used by many studies, such as Henry J. Aaron 
and George M. Von Furstenberg, who used this measure as a standard to 
estimate or assess the ineffieicncy of some existing housing programs. 22 
Using constant elasticity of substitution (CES) utility functions, 
which always imply unitary income elasticities but allow variation in 
the price elasticities of demand, they were able to simulate the inef-
ficiency of subsidies in kind associated with utility functions with 
different elasticities of substitution, and with different rates of 
subsidies. They found the inefficiency or the waste in subsidies to be 
equal to the difference between the subsidy paid by the government under 
the housing program and the requireq increased income that should be 
given to the tenant in order for him to get the same utility as under 
the program given that he now pays the market rent for housing. In terms 
of graphs this could be shown in Figure 3 as the difference between bH3 
and the income increase (parallel upward shift in I 1) required to 
maximize u along the indifference curve u3 • They concluded that even a 
very small benefit to the non-recipients of the public housing subsidy 
21 
Murray, p. 19, and James R. Prescott and Bakir Abukishk, "Some 
Evaluative Aspects of Alternative Housing Subsidies," (a paper prepared 
for Special Issues on Housing), Journal of Economics and Business 
(October, 1974), p. 12. 
22Aaron and Von Furstenberg, "The Inefficiency of Transfers in 
Kind: The Case for Housing Assistance," Western Economic Journal, 9 
(June, 1971), pp. 184-191. 
could very easily justify this type of housing program. In fact they 
said, 
Because of quantity constraints, the inefficiencies may be 
lower even if no external benefits are attached specifically 
to the increased consumption of better housing. If there 
are large inefficiencies in federally assisted housing, they 
will have to be found empirical·ly on the cost side, to the 
extent the administration of particular programs involves 
detailed federal regulations of the conditions of supply. 23 
Michael P. Murray on the other hand used this measure to estimate 
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the direct tenant benefits of several housing programs in the U.S.A. He 
used both the Cobb-Douglas and the generalized CES type of utility func-
tion to estimate tenant benefits. 24 Then he ran a regression analysis 
to see how these benefits were distributed according to family character-
istics, race, and residence for these programs using both the Cobb-
Douglas and the generalized CES utility functions. 
All the previous studies that were mentioned above assumed that the 
direct tenant benefits carne solely from the consumptive satisfaction 
that was experienced by family members within the subsidized housing 
unit. There are some other sutdies cited by James R. Prescott and Bakir 
Abu Kishk, in their paper, "Some Evaluative Aspects of Alternative 
Housing Subsidies."25 These studies claim that additional productivity 
effects should be distinguished in studies attempting to evaluate the 
23Ibid., p. 189. 
24The generalized CES utility function that he used is in the form 
b c d 
u = (aH + E ) where H and E are the quantities of housing and non-
housing goods consumed respectively, u is the level of utility, and a, 
b; c, and dare parameters (dis an arbitrary scale factor). This form 
has the CES as a special case and the Cobb-Douglas as a limiting case. 
25Prescott and Abu Kishk, p. 15. 
I 
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effects of subsidized housing programs. The increase in the quantity 
and quality of housing services will surely have a very significant 
effect on the environment of the dwelling unit, which in turn affects 
the work and leisure attitudes of all family members. 
All of this, of course, has a major effect on the productivities 
of the family members in the economic activities outside the dwelling 
unit. In this case they said, "The money cost of the government 
subsidy underestimates the income impacts on the subsidized family." 
The first study they cited was the study made by Leland S. Burns, 
Robert G. Healey, Donald M. McAllister, and B. Khing Tjise. It was 
concerned with the estimation of health and educational benefits 
attributable to improved housing for low-income families. They analyzed 
controlled groups at six international locations. Workers were studied 
before and after entering the public housing project. Absenteeism, 
output measures, and total production data were available from factory 
records for a period of six months following re-housing. The educa-
tiona! benefits due to improvement in housing conditions were estimated 
from absenteeism data collected on the children of re-housed families 
from local schools and personal interviews with school administrators. 
The health effects of the project were studied by examining out-patient 
and in-patient hospital records for both a control and test group for a 
period of one year before and after re-housing. 
Pine Ridge housing project, South Dakota, was the only site 
analyzed in the United States. They summarized the results of the ·Pine 
Ridge study as the following. 
For the average worker, output per hour increased by 21% in 
the period immediately following re-housing and the number 
of hours worked increased 6%. (The local factory combined 
an hourly wage with a piece-work bonus plan, so workers could 
more flexibly adjust their work effort than under a straight 
time rate with no provisions for overtime.) These productiv-
ity gains lasted for only 27 weE\kS, however, after which 
sharp declines in output per hour occurred; at least one 
explanation of this effect is the threat of expulsion due to 
excessive earnings. The absentee data for school children 
seems less conclusive due both to the small sample (9 cases) 
and a substantial variat:l,on within this group .. Mean absentee-
ism. actually rose by one day per year after re-housing and 
interviews with teachers revealed a wide·range of opinions. 
The health effect appears to be more substantial for com-
parisons of 50 families in both the control and test groups, 
in-patient visits declined 31.7% and out-patient visits rose 
17.6% in the test c.ases compared to c.ontrol families. 26 
The consumer's surplus as \s·~d in this study (or the Hicksian 
measure of tenant benefits) is the increase in income that if given to 
the consumer in the absence of the housing program will put him on the 
same indifference curve that he attains under the housing program (or 
in other words, it is the cash grant which would make the participant 
as well off as the program does) given that he pays the market prices 
for the other goods he buys and the market rent for the housing he 
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consumes. This measure of tenant benefits appears to be very attractive 
and important to the policy makers, because it can be used for 
comparisons and it is relatively easy to calculate. 
To find this required increase in income, assume an individual 
consumer who is not a participant in a housing program. He has a given 
income, and he is in a two commodity world, these two commodities are 
housing services, H, and non-housing goods, X. The market prices of 
these two goods are Ph and Px respectively. Faced with these con-
straints, the consumer (as can be seen in Figure 4) will maximize his 
utility at the point D, where his indifference curve Uo is just tangent 
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Figure 4. Model of Consumer Choice with Consideration of 
Net Tenant Benefits from ~ousing Programs 
to his budget line 11 , or where his marginal rate of substitution 
between the two goods is just equal to their price ratio. At that 
point he will consume H1 units of housing services and x1 units of 
other goods, and he will enjoy the level of utility that is given by 
the indifference curve Uo. Now suppose that our individual consumer 
becomes a participant in a housing program and as a result of that he 
ended up consuming the combination o.f housing and other goods that is 
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indicated by the point (k) on the indifference curve u1 • From Figure 4, 
it is clear that the consumer is enjoying a higher level of utility 
since he is now on a higher indifference curve u1 than before the 
program Uo. It is also clear that he is now paying less for his housing 
as can be seen from the slope of his new budget line AI 2 • What will be 
the increase in income that will make the consumer get the same level 
of satisfaction u1 , given that he pays the market rent for his housing? 
To get the level of satisfaction given by the indifference curve u1 
and paying the market rent for his housing, the consumer needs an in-
come represented by the line BB' (in the figure) which is tangent to 
the indifference curve u1 at the point F, and parallel to the old budget 
line 11 , to indicate that both Ph and Px are the same as before the 
program. We can represent this income by Y and the consumer's actual 
income by Yo. Then the increase in income that will make the consumer 
as well off as under the program will equal Y - Yo. Since we defined 
the tenant benefits according to the Hicksian measure of consumer's 
surplus as the increase in income that will make the consumer as well 
off as under the program, then the net tenant benefits will be equal to: 
Y - Yo. (1) 
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The gross tenant benefits are defined to be the sum of the net 
tenant benefits and the project rent (Rp) that is paid by the tenant,
27 
so: 
Bn + Rp 
t 
Y - Yo + Rp. (2) 
It has to be noticed here that both gross and net tenant benefits 
are not directly measurable since the income necessary to obtain the 
level of satisfaction given by the indifference curve u1 is not directly 
observable; therefore, we have to have a method to estimate B~ from the 
observed data. This method is introduced in the next section. 
Estimating Tenant Benefits 
We have to assume a particular form of the utility function in 
order to get the theoretically correct measure of tenant benefits dis-
cussed above. There have been a lot of arguments about the type of 
utility function that should be used and which is most suitable for 
the analysis and estimation of tenant benefits. Most of the previous 
studies, including DeSalvo's, have utilized the Cobb-Douglas utility 
function as the specific form, with the implication that both income 
and price elasticities of demand for housing are unity. 
The exception to these studies are the study made by Aaron and 
Von Furstenberg and the study made by Murray. Aaron and Von Furstenberg 
utilized a CES-type utility function with the property that only the 
income elasticity of demand for housing is constrained to be unity. 
27 . 
The gross tenant benefits measure the value of the housing 
program to the participant. It shows us how much the housing program 
is really worth to the participant consumer. 
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The price elasticity of demand for housing was assumed to vary, because 
they said that there is more agreement on the income elasticity of 
demand for housing to be unity than on the price elasticity. They 
used this function (as was mentioned before) to calculate the inef-
ficiencies of transfers in kind under alternative assumptions regarding 
the elasticity of substitution between housing and non-housing goods. 
Murray, in his study estimating the direct benefits to tenants in 
some public housing programs in the U.S.A. and the distribution of 
these benefits according to the family characteristics, used both Cobb-
Douglas and the generalized CES type of utility functions. He tested 
the hypothesis, whether the Cobb-Douglas utility function is the true 
function or the generalized CES is the true one. According to his 
analysis he found that the generalized CES utility function is superior 
to the Cobb-Douglas utility function. In terms of estimating the gross 
and net tenant benefits, Cobb-Douglas utility function is a very good 
approximation of the generalized CES utility function. But in terms of 
the distribution of benefits according to the family characteristics, 
the Cobb-Douglas utility function must be used with caution. In this 
study, because of the lack of the data needed by the generalized CES, 
only the Cobb-Douglas utility function is used to estimate tenant 
benefits. 
Estimating Tenant Benefits from the 
Publicly Built Housing Program 
(Using Cobb-Douglas Utility 
Function) 
To estimate tenant benefits using the Cobb-Douglas utility 
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function, 28 assume that the individual consumer has a utility function 
of the form: 
u (3) 
and his budget constraint is: 
Y = PxX + a.PhH (4) 
where: 
H housing services· per unit time 
X units of other commodities per unit time 
a.Ph = the project rent of units of housing 
Px the price of other commodities 
Y = the tenant's income 
e the consumer's rent-income ratio 
a. = 1 when the consumer is not a participant in the housing 
program and less than 1 when he is a participant. 
The assumed utility function i~plies (as mentioned before) unitary 
price and income elasticities of the demand for housing and non-housing 
goods. In other words if income is· constant, expenditures on housing 
and all other non-housing goods remain constant as prices change, and 
for a given price, expenditures on both goods change proportionally to 
changes in income. But the most important point here is the price and 
income elasticities of the demand for housing. With respect to this 
28The methodology used here is based on the methodology developed 
by J. DeSalvo in an article, "A Methodology for Evaluating Housing 
Programs," Journal of Regional Science, 11 (1975), pp. 173-185. 
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point, there are some studies that tested the empirical implications 
of the Cobb-Douglas utility function. With respect to the income 
elasticity of demand for housing, DeLeeuw found that income elasticity 
29 
of rental housing ranges from 0.8 to 1.0. From the standpoint of the 
price elasticity, Muth indicated that it is around unity. 30 Based on 
these studies,-the assumed utility function is consistent with the 
empirical evidence. The estimation of the tenant benefits from the 
above equations will be as the following. 
Using the lagrangian multiplier technique to maximize the utility 
function subject to the budget constraint results in the following 
demand equations: 
Max. ~ = HBXl-B + ;>..(Y - PxX ·- aPhH) 
0 -+ ;>.. 
From equations (6) and (7): 
HB (1 -B)X-S 
Px 
-+ J.K _ H(l - S) 
aPh - Px 







29F. DeLeeuw, "The Demand for Housing: A Review of Cross-Section 
Evidence," Review of Economics and Statistics, 53 (1971), pp. 1-10. 
30R. F. Muth, "The Demand for Non-Farm Housing," in A. C. Harberger 
(Ed.), The Demand for Durable Goods (Chicago, 1960), pp. 29-96. 
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By substitution of equation (10) into the budget line equation, we get 
the following: 
Y = Px~(l - B}aP~ 
SPx 
+ aPhH (11) 
y H[(l - S}aPh] . s + aPhH (12) 
y H[(l - k) aPh + aP~ (13) 
y HaPh[1 ; s + 1] (14) 
y HaPh[~J (15) 
SY HaPh (16) 
H SY/aPh (17) 
This is the demand curve equation for housing services. It shows 
that the quantity of housing services demanded depends upon preferences, 
income, relative prices. 
By substituting for H into equation (10) the demand equation for 
the other goods X will be: 
X 
SY/aPh [(1 ~ S}aPh] 
SPx 
X = (1 - S)Y/Px 
(18) 
(19) 
which means tha't the demand for other goods X is equal to the share of 
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the tenants income spent on them divided by their price. 
Suppose that the consumer participates in the housing program 
(which means now that a is less than 1) and obtains H1 units of housing, 
and x1 units of other goods X with an income equal to Y0 • The utility 
level associated with these amounts will be: 
(20) 
To estimate the benefits he gets from the partic.ipation in the 
housing program, we need to know how much income is necessary for the 
consumer to obtain the level of utility u1 , given that he is required 
to pay the market rent for the housing services. This income can be 
found by substituting the demand equations with (a= 1) into the utility 
function after setting U = u1 and then we solve for Y. In other words 
what we are after is the level of income (Y) that solves the following 
equation: 
(21) 
By taking Y in the right hand side out of the parentheses, we get the 
following: 
[
y ci - aPhH J l-(3 
_:::_ _ __:.1 [H ] (3 = 
Px 1 
(22) 
Moving the constant terms in the right hand side into the left side 
results in: 
or 
Knowing that PhH1 = Rrn (the market rent) and 
aPhH1 
rent), the above equation can be written as: 





Defining net tenant benefits as the difference between th
e income 
that will make the tenant as well~ff without the program
 as with it (Y), 
and his actual income (Y0 ), then the net tenant benef
its will be equal 
to: 





This is the amount of money which if added to the consume
r's income. 
would lead him to attain a level of utility u1 equal to that attaine
d 
under the housing program, This is the net tenant benefi
ts. The gross 
tenant benefits can be defined as the sum of the net tena
nt benefits and 
the pro~ect rent, or 
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(28) 
.so by estimating Y we can estimate B~, and by adding Rp to it, we get 
Bg. 
t 
Tenant subsidies in this program will be equal to 
s Rm - Rp. (29) 
Estimating Tenant Benefits from the Interest 
Free Loans Program (Using Cobb-Douglas 
Utility Function) 
According to this program, the people whose monthly incomes are 
within the range of 50 to 99 Libyan Dinars, have the opportunity to get 
interest free loans from the Industrial and Real Estate Bank, provided 
that the individual has the land to build the house on. These loans 
are paid back in equal monthly payments which cover the principal of 
the loans only. The payment period ranges from 7 to 10 years. So, this 
program is a price subsidy program since it enables its tenants to get 
houses at prices less than what they would be paying had they got these 
loans from the private capital market at the market interest rate. 
If they had those loans from'the private market they would be 
paying a monthly price that should cover the monthly payment of principal 
of the loan, the monthly interest charges, monthly maintenance expendi-
tures, monthly.land rent, and monthly depreciation. 
'Let us call this market price Pm, so 
Pm Mp + Mn + LR + ~ (30) 
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where 
Pm = the price the tenant would pay given that he had the loan from 
the private capital market 
Mp = monthly payment of the principal of the loan plus monthly 
interest charges 
Mn = monthly maintenance expenditures 
LR monthly land rent 
~ monthly depreciation. 
But under this program the price the tenants will pay will be 
lower than the market price (Pm) by the amount of interest charges. 
Let us.call this monthly· payment (Pp) the program price. Following 
this reasoning the program price ·would be: 
Pp Pm - monthly intereqt c~arges. 
The monthly tenant subsidy'in this program will be equal to the 
' monthly interest charges the tenant did not pay which is: 
Pm - Pp. (31) 
To estimate tenant benefits ~rom this program using Cobb-Douglas 
utility functions, assume the individual consumer in this program has • 
a utility function of the form: 
(32) 
where 
0 < s < 1 
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and his budget constraint is: 
Y = PxX + aPhH (33)· 
where: 
H = housing services per unit time 
X = units of other commodities per unit time 
aPh = the program price of housing service 
Px = the price of other commoditi.es 
y = the tenant's income 
B = the consumer's housing monthly payment/income 
ratio 
-a. 1 when the consumer,is not a participant and less 1 when 
he is a participant in; the housing program. 
-Maximizing the utility function subject to the budget constraint 
results in the following demand equations: 
H = SY/a.Ph (34) 
and 
X (1- S)Y/Px. 31 (35) 
Suppose that the consumer participates in the housing program 
(which means that a. is less than 1) 'and obtains H1 units of housing and 
x1 units of other goods X with an income equal to Y0 • The utility level 
a'ssociated with these amounts will be: 
31 For complete analysis of finding these demand equations see pages 
80, 81 and 82 in this chapter. 
U = HSXl-S 
1 1 1 . 
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(36) 
To estimate the benefits the consumer gets from the participation 
~the housing program, we need to know how much income is necessary 
for the consumer to obtain the level of utility u1 , given that he is 
required to pay the market price for the housing services. This in-
come can be found by substituting the demand equations with (a = 1) 
into the utility function. after setting U = u1 and then solving for Y. 
In other words, what we are after is the level·of income (Y) that solves 
the following equation: 
11(1 - D)Y.o] l-(3[.(3Yo](3 = r ll or~~ (3 
L PxfJ J aPh l(l ;x B)YJ -fJ ~j (37) 
which if we take the Y's in the right hand side out of the parentheses 
turns out to be: 
1-B 8 . . r(l - 8)Y0J rsY0 l =[l _ s]l-8 l-(3[~](3 (3 
t Px Lphj Px Y Ph Y • (38) 
If the constant terms in the right hand side are taken to the left hand 
side we get the following: 
y (39) 
y . (40) 
or 




Since net tenant benefits are defined (as in the publicly built 
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(41) 
housing program) as the difference between the income that will make 
the tenant as well off without the program as with it (Y), and the 
tenant's actual income (Y ), then net tenant benefits will be equal to: 0 
Bn = y - y 
t 0 
= y 
-(3 y a -
0 0 
which can be written as: 
where 





Pm = the market price of the housing service per month given the 
loan was taken from the private capital market 
Pp the program price of the housing service per month 
Y the tenant's actual income ' 0 
(3 the consumer's housing monthly payment/income ratio. 





It was thought before that the monthly mortgage payment which the 
tenant pays to the Industrial and Real Estate Bank could be used to 
estimate the program price for the housing service (Pp). But then it 
was found out that this payment does not in fact represent all that the 
tenant pays for the housing service under this program. It only 
represents the monthly payment for the principal of the loan which is 
only a fraction of what the tenant pays for the housing service. In 
addition to it the tenant still has to pay maintenance expenditures, 
pay for the land, and depreciation. So it was figured that these other 
payments have to be added to the monthly mortgage payment to the 
Industrial and Real Estate Bank in order to get an estimate to the 
tenant's actual monthly payment for his housing unit under this housing 
program. 
Now that the equations for estimating the tenant benefits from both 
types of housing programs are set out, the next important thing to con-
sider is the necessary information and the required data to estimate 
these benefits. 
From the analysis it is cl~ar that, the required data for the 
\ 
publicly built housing program is: 
1. The actual rent of the program unit, or the rent that is paid by 
the tenant when he is a participant in the housing program (Rp). 
2. The second item needed is the tenant's actual income (Y ). 
0 
3. The third item is the market rent of the program unit, or the 
rent the program unit will command if it was rented in a free market 
condition (Rm). 
4. The fourth item is the parameter (S), or the rent-income 
ratio, that means the fraction of the tenant's income which has 
to be spent on housing when he is not a participant in the housing 
program. 
For the interest free loans program the required data is: 
1. Pm or the monthly payment for the housing when the loan to 
build it was taken from the free capital market. 





Y or the tenant's actual income. 
0 
Pp or the monthly payment for the housing unit under the 
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How can this kind of data be found? For the publicly built housing 
program, the first two variables are observable and can be obtained 
from the data available in the applications to this program. 
The other two, the market rent and the parameter (S) are not 
directly observable and so they ha:Ve to be estimated. 
With respect to the market rent (Rm) of the housing unit, there are 
some alternative ways to estimate it. Perhaps the easiest way, as men-
tioned' by DeSalvo, is to ask someone with good knowledge and experience 
with the housing market in which the program operates, to estimate the 
market rents of the program units. The other alternative approach which 
was also mentioned by DeSalvo is to make rent a function of housing 
characteristics and estimate the rent' function to be used for estimating 
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the market rents for the program units. 
In the case of this study, a sample from the private housing market 
was taken, and information about rent, income, family size, and number 
of rooms in the housing units was collected. From this information, a 
rent function is calculated, where rent is a function of the number of 
rooms. The estimated rent equation is 
Rm = 2.33262712 + 11.20944310 NR. 
(9.81549) 
R2 - 0.4957 
where Rm is the market rent and NR is the number of rooms. This func-
tion is used.to estimate the market rent for the housing units in the 
two housing programs. 
With regard to the tenant's rent-income ratio (B) it was suggested 
that it is better not to use the tenant's currently observed rent-
income ratio to estimate the parameter (B), because it was thought that 
the consumer's patterns of expenditures when he is a participant in a 
housing program will be different from his expenditure patterns when he 
is not a participant. An alternative way to explain the ratio is either 
to take the average rent-income ratio of people in the private rental 
market, or to estimate a relation between rent expenditures and family 
characteristics such as income, family size, etc. Then this relation-
ship could be used to estimate (B) for a particular tenant. For this 
' 
study the average rent-income ratio of people in the private market is 
used because when a relation between rent expenditures and family size 
was tried, family size turned out to be not significant. 
With regard to the data required for estimating tenant's benefits 
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from the interest ·free loans program, the following procedure is used: 
1. 1.Jith respect to Y or the tenant's actual income, it is (as in 
0 
the publicly built housing program) observable and obtained from the 
applications to this program. 
2. With respect to Pm; there is no data available about this 
variable. To estimate it, Rm (or the market rent of the housing unit) 
was calculated in the same way as in publicly built housing program, 
and used as an estimate of Pm. 
3. With regard to S; since Rm is used instead of Pm and S = Rm/ 
income, the same 13 is used for both programs or that S average S in 
the private market. 
4. Pp was calculated by subtracting the monthly interest charges 
from Pm; that is, Pp = Pm - monthly interest charges. 
5. Monthly interest charges on the loan were calculated using 
interest tables, based on the loan period and on 7 percent compound 
32 interest rate. 
As it was mentioned before, a Cobb-Douglas utility function implies 
that both price and income elasticities of the demand for housing are 
unity. If Cobb-Douglas is the true utility function for the 
participants in public housing programs, then our estimates of the 
direct tenant benefits are correct and there will be no bias. If the 
true uiility function is not the Cobb-Douglas, but some other form of 
utility function, what will happen to our estimates of the direct tenant· 
32This is considered to be the most appropriate rate of interest 
for this kind of loan. See Central Bank of Libya, Economic Bulletin, 
Statistical Tables, Table No. 22 (January-March, 1975). 
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benefits? 33 The answer to this question will depend on the value of 
price and income elasticities implied by that function. Suppose the 
"true" function implies a unit income elasticity but not a unit price 
elasticity. What will happen to the estimates of the direct tenant 
benefits compared to that under the Cobb-Douglas? If its price 
elasticity is less than one, the results are shown in Figure 5. In 
this figure, the ray Icc represents the income consumption curve for 
both functions, which reflect the implication of unity income elasticity 
for both functions. The horizontal line Pee represents the price con-
sumption curve for the CD function which reflects the unitary price elas-
ticity implication of that function. The price consumption curve of the 
other function is the line Pee' which reflects the assumption that its 
price elasticity is less than unity. The solid curves in the figure rep-
resent the consumer's indifference curves wheri Cobb-Douglas is his util-
ity function. The dotted curves represent his indifference curves where 
the other function is his utility function. Before the housing program 
the consumer is_maximizing his utility subject to his budget constraint 
at point (E) according to both utility functions. After paricipating 
in the housing program, his point of maxim~m utility depends on the 
form of the utility function. If it is Cobb-Douglas, he will maximize 
his utility at point (G). If it is the other function, then his point 
of utility maximization will be point (k). The direct tenant benefits 
were defined as the increase in the consumer's income that will enable 
him to get the same level of satisfaction as the program does. Under 
33The analysis in the rest of this section is developed through a 
group discussion among Ronald L. Moomaw, J~iJ.kie Earl Adams, and the 
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Figure 5. A Theoretical Model of the Overestimate of Net Tenant 
Benefits when the Price Elasticity of Demand for 
Housing Service is Less than Unity 
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the Cobb-Douglas utility function, this will be estimated by the vertical 
distance (AB). Under the other utility function, it will be estimated 
by the vertical distance (CD), which means that in this case, Cobb-
Douglas utility functiQn will over-e~;timate the direct tenant benefits. 
On the other hand, if the other utility function has a unit income 
elasticity and price elasticity of more than one, then Cobb-Douglas 
function will under-estimate the direct tenant benefits. 
With respect to the income elasticity, assume that the other func-
tion has a unit price elasticity and an income elasticity greater than 
one. This case is illustrated in Figure 6. In this figure, the line 
Pee is the price consumption curve for both functions. The line Icc is 
the income consumption curve for the Cobb-Douglas, and Icc' is the 
income. consumption curve for the other function. The maximum utility 
position of the consumer b'efore the .housing program is at the point (H) 
for both functions. After the program the consumer will maximize his 
~tility at the point (M) for both functions also. But the benefits 
(or increase. in the consumer's income that will make him as well as the 
program) will be different from one function to another. Under Cobb-
Douglas, it will be the distance (A2B2), but under the other function, 
it will be the distance (C2D2). If we draw two lines, one through the 
point (A2) and the other through the point (C2), and both parallel to 
the budget line; (I1), we find that the line that goes through the point 
(C2) cuts the vertical axis at a higher level than the line which goes 
through the point (A2), which means that the direct tenant benefits is 
Housing in Oklahoma: Case Studies of Benefits and Costs in Selected 
City Sizes" (unpub. Ph.D. dissertation, Oklahoma State University, 
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Figure 6. A Theoretical Model of the Underestimate of Net 
Tenant ,Benefits when the Income Elasticity 
of Demand for Housing is Greater than Unity 
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larger under the other function than under Cobb-Douglas (under the above 
assumptions). This is the same as saying that if the true consumer 
function has a unit price elasticity and an income elasticity greater 
than one, then using Cobb-Douglas function to estimate direct tenant 
benefits will result in an underestimation of these benefits. If the 
consumer's utility function has a unit price elasticity but less than 
unity income elasticity, then using Cobb-Douglas wil'l result in an over-
estimation of tenant benefits (this case is not shown in the. figure). 
CHAPTER V 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
This chapter represents .the empirical part of this study. It ex-
plains the procedures that were used to collect the data, and how the 
samples were designed. Utilizing the research methodology presented in 
Chapter IV it provides us with an example calculation of net tenant 
benefits in each program. The way of calculating tenant subsidies is 
also presented, Using the sample observations based on case-study 
data, the discussion also includes the ~istribution of net tenant . . 
benefits among tenant families in each. program according to income, 
family.size, and age of the head of the tenant family. A linear regres-
sian analysis correlating net tenant benefits to family income, family 
size and age of the head of the family is also introduced in this 
chapter. Finally, using the regression analysis results, answers to the 
study questions are presented. 
Data Collection 
Because most of the data needed for this study is available only in 
the files of the tenants and not published anywhere, the author had to 
go on a field trip back to Libya to collect the data himself. 
Data collection process took about four and one-half months, from 
April 16 to August 28, 1975. Using a random numbers table, a random 
sample from the files of each program was taken after assigning each 
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file a serial number. 1 Each sample consists of at least 8 percent of 
the total files of the tenants in Tripoli city. 2 
The sample from the publicly built housing program contains 608 
observations from a total of 5,535 which is 11 percent of the tenants 
who are living in rented publicly built housing units in Tripoli city. 
With respect to the interest free loans program, 640 observations were 
included in the sample which represents 8.3 percent of the total 7,644 
interest free loans granted to tenants in Tripoli city. 
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The information taken from the files of the publicly built housing 
program were: tenant monthly income, tenant family size, age of the 
head of the family, number of rooms, and the monthly program rent of the 
housing unit. 
With respect to the interest free loans program, the information 
taken was the same except for the monthly mortgage payment instead of 
the program rent. 
As was mentioned before, both the market rent of the housing unit 
(Rm), and the tenant rent-income ratio (S) in the absence of the 
3 program are not observed but they were estimated. 
1In both programs, not all the files were given a serial number. 
For the publicly built housing program, some of the files were either 
arranged alphabetically or given serial numbers at each different 
project. With respect to the interest free loans program, the files 
were assigned different numbers but the files of the tenants in Tripoli 
city were not separated from other cities. They have to be separated 
and assigned new numbers in order to be able to take the sample from 
them. 
2 The samples were taken from the tenants of these two housing 
programs in Tripoli city, only. 




Since the samples were quite large, all observations cannot be 
printed here, but the most important empirical results of data analysis 
will be presented. The focal points of the discussion here are: (1) 
information on the economic and social characteristics of tenant fam-
ilies in both samples, (2) net tenant benefits and subsidies, (3) a 
sample calculation of net tenant benefits from each program, (4) the 
distribution of net tenant benefits among tenant families by income, 
family size, and age of the head of the family, and (5) the results of 
regressing net tenant benefits in each program against tenant's income, 
family size and age of the head of the family. 
Economic and Social Characteristics 
of Tenant Families 
The following discussion considers the social and economic char-
acteristics of tenant families in both samples. As was mentioned before 
both samples include several informative characteristics of tenant 
families in both programs. These characteristics are summarized in 
Table XI. From that table we find that the mean monthly tenant income 
in the sample from the publicly built housing program is L.D. 57.299. 
Tenant monthly income varies from as low as L.D. 8.00 to as high as 
L.D. 205.00. Family size varies. from two persons to 14 persons with a 
mean of 5. 7 persons per family. ' The number of rooms in the housing 
units in the sample varies from two to five rooms with a mean of 3.83. 
Age of the head of the family ranges from 20 years to 81 years with a 
mean of 43.7 years. 
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TABLE XI 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF TENANT FAMILIES 
Sample from Sample from 
Publicly Built Free Interest 
Subject Housing Program Loans Program 
Total number of tenant families 608 640 
Total monthly income 34838.08 46078.70 
Mean monthly income 57.299 71.998 
Highest monthly income 205.000 150.000 
Lowest monthly income 8.000 25.000 
Mean family size 5.7 5.2 
Largest family size · 14 18 
Smallest family size 2 1 
Highest number of rooms 5 6 
Lowest number of rooms 2 3 
Mean number of rooms 3.83 3.97 
Oldest family head 81 80 
Youngest family head 20 22 
Mean age of the familyhead 43.7 38.8 
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With respect to the sample from the interest free loans program, 
the following characteristics are observed. The tenant monthly income 
varies from L.D. 25.00 to L.D. 150.00 with a mean of L.D. 71.998. The 
family size ranges from one _person t.o 18 persons .with a mean of 5. 2. 
The age of the head of the family varies from 22 years to 80 years with 
a mean of 38.8 years. The number of rooms varies from three to six with 
a mean of 3.97. If we compare the tenants in both programs with each 
other we find that tenants of the publicly built housing program are on 
the average have a significantly lower monthly income (Z = 11.902, 
P < .001), have a significantly larger family size (Z = 3.737, P < .001), 
have a significantly older family head (Z = 7.623, P < .001), and have 
a significantly lower number of rooms (Z :::; 5.029, P < .001) than tenants 
of interest free loans program. 
Benefits and Subsidies 
In addition to illustrating how net tenant benefits are calculated 
using the research methodology presented in Chapter IV, the following 
discussion will provide us with monetary values of totals and means of 
monthly net tenant benefits and monthly tenant subsidies in each pro-
gram. A comparison between total annual net tenant benefits and total 
annual tenant subsidies and tenant benefits-tenant subsidies ratio in 
4 
each program are also presented .. 
4Table ·XII (page 108) in this chapter. sq.o:w~, the means, and totals 
for monthly net tenant benefits and monthly tenant subsidies in each 
program. 
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A Sample Calculation of Net Tenant Benefits 
from the Publicly Built Housing Program 
As it was pointed out in Chapter IV, net tenant benefits consist 
of the amount of money that if added to the tenant's actual income will 
5 
make him as well off as the program does. A sample calculation of rtet 
tenant benefits, based on the assumptionof unitary price and income 
elasticities of demand for housing service, is the subject of this 
discussion. The example here is based on a tenant residing in a 
publicly built house in Tripoli city. 
The level of Y is not observable; however, by using the methodology 
shown in equation (25) in Chapter IV, it is possible to estimate it for 
the tenant. This income estimate of Y would allow the tenant to attain 
a level of satisfaction equal to that attained under the housing 
program. 
y 
Equation (25), which is stated as: 
( ·) S(Y - RSp)l-S R; __:::.~---
in Chapter IV, yields the money estimate of Y, where the variables are 
Rm the market rent for public housing service, 
s the tenant's rent-income ratio, 
Rp the program rent for public housing service, 
y the tenant's actual income. 
0 
A tenant residing in publicly built housing unit in Tripoli city 
had an actual monthly income (Y ) of L.D. 60.00, ~nd a rent-income ratio 
0 
5This is a price-equivalent variation measure of consumer's surplus. 
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(B) of 0.36485973 .. The particular dwelling unit in the program had a 
monthly program rent (Rp) of L.D. 1.50, and the monthly market rental 
value of the particular unit was L.D. 47.1704. The monthly money esti-
mate of Y was solved by 
y 
f )0. 3648597 3 
1 4 7.1704 
\0.36485973 
1-'0.36485973 
( 60 - 1. 50 . ) 
1 - 0.36485973 . 
which is equation (25). The money estimate of Y is, therefore, L.D. 
104.2897 per month. In order to get the net tenant benefits, the actual 
monthly income (Y ) of the tenant is subtracted from Y. Consequently, 
0 
Y (L.D. 104.2897) minus Y (L.D. 60.00) equals net tenant benefits (Bn). 
0 . t 
Thus, monthly net tenant benefits are estimated to be L.D. 44.2897. 
The total monthly net tenant benefits for the sample from the publicly 
built housing program were obtained by adding the individual monthly net 
tenant benefits together. 
A Sample Calculation of Net Tenant 
Benefits in the Interest Free 
Loans Program 
As was mentioned in Chapter IV, even though this program differs 
somewhat from the publicly built housing program, it is like the other 
program in the sense that it is a price subsidy program. Net tenant 
benefits in this program also consist of the maount of money that if 
added tO the tenant's actual income will enable him to attain the same 
utility level as under the program. In the following discussion 
a sample calculation of net tenant benefits from, this program, based 
on the assumption of unitary price and income elasticities of demand 
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for housing service will be presented. 
The example here is based on a tenant who had an interest free 
loan from the Industrial and Real Estate Bank and built a house with 
that loan in Tripoli city. 
It is the same with this program as the. other one, the level of Y 
is not observable; however, by using the methodology shown in equation 
(41) in Chapter IV, it is possible to estimate it .for the tenant. 
This income estimate of Y would allow the tenant to attain a level 
of satisfaction equal to that attained under the interest free loans 
program. Equation (41) which is stated as 
y Y (R.£.)-s 
o Pm 
in Chapter IV, yields the money estimate of Y where the variables are 
Pm the monthly payment for the housing services if the tenant 
had the loan from the private capital market, 
Pp an estimate of housing monthly payment under the program, 
S monthly payment-income ratio, 
Y the tenant's actual income. 
0 
This tenant in our example had a montly income of L.D. 85.00, and 
with a monthly payment-income ratio of 0.36485973. The particular 
housing unit he had would cost him L.D. 47.1704 monthly if he had the 
loan in the private capital market (Pm), and would cost him L.D. 33.4883 




y 85 •00 47.1704 
which is equation (41). The money estimate of Y is therefore L.D. 
96.3167 per month. Net tenant benefits have been defined to be equal 
to Y minus Y . Consequently, the monthly net benefits for this 
0 
particular tenant will be equal to L.D. 96.3167 minus L.D. 85.00 
L.D. 11.3167. 
The total monthly net tenant benefits for the sample from the 
interest free loans program were obtained by adding the individual 
monthly net tenant benefits together. 
Net Tenant Benefits from the Publicly 
Built Housing Program 
As it was mentioned before the total monthly net tenant benefits 
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from the publicly built housing program are calculated by adding up the 
individual monthly net tenant benefits together for the tenants in the 
sample. This benefit amounted to L.D. 22353.8583. The mean monthly 
net tenant benefits came up to be L.D. 36.7662. The total annual net 
tenant benefits will be equal to L.D. 22353.8583 x 12 which is L.D. 
268246.2996. 
Net Tenant Benefits from the Interest 
Free; Loans Program 
The total monthly net benefits for the people in the sample from 
this program are obtained by adding up the individual monthly net 
b~nefits together. This number came to L.D. 6101.2206 and the mean 
monthly net tenant benefits is L.D. 9.5332. The total annual net tenant 
benefits are L.D. 6101.2206 x 12 which is L.D. 73214.6472. 
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Tenant Subsidies 
The individual tenant subsidy for each consumer of low-rent public 
housing is conceptually shown as the distance (AC) in Figure 4 in 
Chqpter IV. Also, equation (29) in Chapter IV shows that the tenant 
subsidy (S) is market rent (Rm) minus project rent (Rp). Once the 
market rental value of a unit is estimated, as was done with net tenant 
benefits, the project rent of that unit is subtracted from the market 
rental value. For example, if the market rent is L.D. 47.1704, and the 
project rent is L.D. 1.5, then the individual monthly tenant subsidy (S) 
is L.D. 47.1704 minus L.D. 1.5, or L.D. 45.6704. The individual tenant 
subsidies were summed to obtain estimates of the total monthly tenant 
subsidies. This ~arne up to be L.D. 24343.8438. 
With respect to the inte~est free loans program, the tenant subsidy 
also can be represented either py the dist~nce (AC) in Figure 4 in 
Chapter IV, or by the equation number (31) in the same chapter. Accord-
ing to that equation tenant subsidy is equal to monthly payment for the 
housing unit if the loan was taken from the private capital market (Pm) 
minus its monthly payment under the program as where the loan is taken 
from the Industrial and Real Estate Bank (Pp). 6 Once again, if the 
market monthly pay'ment for the housing unit is estimated, the tenant 
subsidy can be easily obtained by subtracting the program monthly payment 
from the market monthly payment. Suppose, for example, that the market 
monthly payment for a housing unit is L.D. 58.3798 and its program 
\ 
monthly payment is L.D. 50.7744, then the individual monthly tenant 
6 The monthly tenant subsidy is equal to·t;he·tru)El:thly interest 
charges on this loan. 
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subsidy (S) is L.D. 58.3798 minus L.D. 50.7744 or L.D. 7.6054. The 
total monthly subsidy is obtained by summing up all individual monthly 
subsidies, and it came up to be L.D. 8483.4285. 
Comparing net tenant benefits with tenant subsidies in each program 
we get the following results. As can be seen from Table XII, the total 
monthly net tenant benefits for the sample from the· publicly built 
housing program added up to L.D. 22353.8583, while the total monthly 
subsidy amounted to L.D. 24343.8438. On an annual basis, net tenant 
benefits would be L.D. 268246.2996, and tenant subsidies would be L.D. 
292126.1256. The ratio of tenant benefit subsidies would be L.D. 
264246.2996/L.D. 292126.1256, which is 0.918255. 
TABLE XII 




Subject Housing Program 
Total number of observations 608 
Net tenant benefits 
Total net tenant benefits L.D. 22353.8583 
Mean net tenant benefits, L.D.: 36.7662 
Tenant subsidies 
Total subsidies L.D. 24343.8438 
Mean subsidies L.D. 40.0392 
Net tenant benefits-teriant 









L.D '; 0.71919 
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With regard to the interest free loans program, the total monthly 
net tenant benefits are L.D~ 6101.2206, and the total monthly subsidies 
are L. D. 8483.4285. On an annual basis they will be L. D .. 73214.64 72, and 
L.D. 101801.142, respectively. The ratio of tenant benefits to tenant 
subsidies would be L.D. 73214.6472/L.D. 101801.142 or 0.71919. 
From the above analysis it is clear that net tenant benefits in 
both programs are less than tenant subsidies. This means that addi-
.tional benefits must occur in order for these two housing programs to 
be justified. Taking net tenant benefits-tenant subsidies ratio as an 
efficiency criteria, we can say that the publicly built housing program 
is.more effective than the interest free loans program since its ratio 
is approximately 0.92, while the interest free loans program ratio is 
only 0. 72. 
Distribution of Monthly Total Net Tenant 
Benefits from the Publicly Built Housing 
Program Within Tenant's Income Classes 
The distribution of total monthly net tenant benefits from the 
publicly built housing program within tenants of different income 
classes is shown in Table XIII. From that table we find the following. 
1. People with monthly incomes less than or equal to 25 Libyan 
Dinars constituted 1.81 percent of total number of tenants in the 
sample. They got 0.60 percent of the total monthly income and received 
1.34 percent of the total monthly net tenant benefits. 
2. People with monthly incomes greater than 25, but less than or 




income < 25 
Tenants with 
25 < income < 50 
Tenants with 
50 < income < 75 
Tenants with 
75 < income < 100 
Tenants with 
income > 100 
TABLE XIII 
DISTRIBUTION OF MONTHLY NET TENANT BENEFITS FROM THE PUBLICLY BUILT 
HOUSING PROGRAM WITHIN TENANT'S INCOME CLASSES 
Total Monthly Percentage of 
Total No. Percentage of Net Tenant Total Monthly 
of Total No. of Benefits in Net Tenant Total Monthly 
Observations Observations L.D. Benefits Income 
608 100% 22353.8583 100% 34838.080 
11 1.81% . -299.7629 1.34% 209.000 
246 40.46% 9275.7545 41.50% 10163.500 
273 44.90% 11171.5166 49.97% 16425.000 
45 7.40% 1354.2922 6.06% 3947.500 














of tenants in the sample. They had 29.17 percent of the total monthly 
income, and received 41.50 percent of the total monthly net tenant 
benefits. 
3. Tenants whose monthly incomes are higher than 50 and less than 
or equal to 75 Libyan Dinars constituted 44.90 percent of the total num-
ber of tenants in the sample, had 47.15 percent of the total monthly 
income and received 49.97 percent of the total monthly net tenant 
benefits. 
4. Tenants with monthly incomes higher than 75, but less than or 
equal to 100 Libyan Dinars constituted only 7.40 percent of the total 
number of tenants, had 11. 33 percent of the total monthly income and 
received only 6.06 percent of the total monthly net tenant benefits. 
5. Finally, tenants with monthly incomes that were higher than 100 
Libyan Dinars represented only 5.43 percent of the total number of 
tenants in the sample, had 11..75 percent of the total monthly income, 
and received only 1.13 percent of the total monthly net tenant benefits. 
From Table XIII we find also that 92.81 percent of the total 
monthly net tenant benefits goes to tenants with monthly incomes equal 
to or less than 75 Libyan Dinars, and only 7.19 percent of the total 
monthly net tenant benefits goes to tenants with monthly incomes higher 
than 75 Libyan Dinars. In terms of the percentage of participation 
we find that tenants with monthly incomes equal to or less than 75 
Libyan Dinars constituted 87.17 percent of the total participants of 
the program; while tenants with monthly incomes higher than 75 Libyan 
Dinars represented only 12.83 percent of the t~tal participants. 
According to these statistics we can say that the publicly built ho:using 
program does serve its objective of paying more attention to the people 
with relatively low incomes than people with relatively high incomes 
both in terms of participation and benefits received. 
Distribution of Total Monthly Net Tenant 
Benefits from the Publicly Built 
Housing Program According 
to Family Size 
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The classification of tenants in the publicly built housing program 
according to their family siz.es and the distribution of benefits among 
different family sizes are shown in Table XIV. From that table we find 
that both percentage of participati~n and percentage of .benefits 
received increase as family size increases until family size of six is 
reached. After that family size both percentages start to decrease. 
For tenants with family size of six 'or less they represent 66.94 percent 
of the total participants and receive 67.52 percent of the total 
monthly net tenant benefits. The t~nants with family sizes of more 
than six, represent 33.06 percent of the total number of participants 
in the housing program, and receive 32.48 percent of the total monthly 
net tenant benefits received from this housing program. 
The Distribution of Total Monthly Net Tenant 
Benefits from the Publicly Built Housing 
Program Among Tenants According to the 
Age of the Head of the Family 
This distribution is shown in Table XV. From that table we find 
that tenant families headed with persons with age of less than 30 years 
represented 12.99 percent of the total number of families that·· 
Family Size 
All sample 
FZ = 2 
FZ = 3 
FZ = 4 
FZ = 5 
FZ = 6 
FZ = 7 
FZ = 8 
FZ = 9 
FZ = 10 
FZ = 11 
FZ = 12 
FZ = 13 
FZ = 14 
TABLE XIV 
DISTRIBUTION OF MONTHLY NET TENANT BENEFITS FROM THE PUBLICLY BUILT 
HOUSING PROGRAM SAMPLE ACCORDING TO FAMILY SIZE 
Total Monthly Percentage of 
Percentage of Net Tenant Total Monthly Total Monthly 
No. of Total No. of Benefits in Net Tenant Income in 
Observations Observations L.D. Benefits L.D. 
608 100% 22353.8583 100% 34838.0800 
39 6.41% 1345.7296 6.02% 2106.8300 
71 11.68% 2530.1009 11.32% 4161.5000 
94 15.46% . 3468.2610 15.52% 5439.7500 
100 16.45% 3668.3510 16.41%- 5641.5000 
103 16.94% 4080.0731 18.25% 5464.5000 
68 11.18% 2504.5247 11.20% 3799.7500 
57 9.38% 2071.0116 9.27% 3498.2500 
37 6.09% 1397.8906 6.25% 2119.0000 
25 4.11% 816.7732 3.65% 1622.0000 
6 0.99% 160.3286 0. 72% 461.0000 
5 0.82% 177.8883 0.80% 385.0000 
2 0.33% 81.1187 0.36% 60.0000 
1 0.16% 51.8069 0.23% 79.0000 






















age _s, 30 
People with 
30 < age ..s, 40 
People with 
40 < age .2_ 50 
People with 
50 < age .2_ 60 
People with 
age > 60 
TABLE XV 
DISTRIBUTION OF MONTHLY NET TENANT BENEFITS FROM PUBLICLY BUILT 
HOUSING PROGRAM AMONG TENANTS ACCORDING TO AGE CLASSES 
Total Monthly Percentage of 
Percentage of Net Tenant Total Monthly Total Monthly 
No. of Total No. of Benefits in Net Tenant Income in 
Observations Observations L.D. Benefits L.D. 
608 100% 22353.8583 100% 34838.080 
79 12.99% 2666.6549 11.93% 4983.000 
192 31.58% 7024.5786 31.42% 11329.830 
167 27.47% 6118.5157 27.37% 9573.000 
103 16.94% 4029.3314 18.03% 5379.500 
67 11.02% 2514.7777 11.25% 3572.750 











participated in the housing program and received 11.93 percent of the 
total monthly net tenant benefits -received by all tenants. 
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Families headed by individuals with age higher than 30 and less 
than 40 years represented 31.58 percent of the total families 
parttcipating and received 31.42 percent of the total monthly net tenant 
benefits received from this housing program. 
Families headed by tenants with age higher than 40 but equal or 
less than 50 represented 27.47 percent of the total number of tenants 
in this housing program and received 27.37 percent of the total monthly 
net tenant benefits received by the tenants in the sample from this 
housing program. 
Families headed by tenants with age higher than 50 but equal to or 
less than 60 years represented 16.94 percent of the total number of 
tenants in the sample and received 18.03 percent from the total monthly 
net tenant benefits attained by all the tenants in the sample. 
Families headed with individuB;ls with age higher than 60 years 
represented 11.02 percent of the total number of participants in the 
sample~ and received 11.25 percent of the total monthly net tenant ben-
efits received by all participant~ in the sample. 
From these statistics we ca:n say that the distribution of total 
monthly net tenant benefits is in favor of tenant families headed with 
relatively older p'eople which means that older tenants are getting more 
attention and benefiting more in this housing program than relatively 
younger ones. 
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Distribution of Total Monthly Net Tenant 
Benefits from the Interest Free Loans 
Program Among Tenants of Different 
Income Classes 
This distribution is shown in Table XVI. In that table the tenants 
are divided 'into four income classes: (1) tenants with monthly incomes 
less than or equal to SO Libyan Dinars, (2) tenants with monthly 
incomes greater than SO but less than or equal to 7~ Libyan Dinars, 
(3) tenant.s with monthly incomes greater than 7S but less than or equal 
to 100 Libyan Dinars, and (4) tenants with monthly incomes greater than 
100. According to these income classes the distribution of tenant's 
total montply net tenant benefits, and the total monthly income are 
provided. 
From Table XVI we find the fol,lowing: 
1. Tenants with monthly inc·omes less than or equal to SO Libyan 
Di~ars represented 20.16 percent from the total number of tenants in 
the sample, they had 12.0 percent· of the total monthly income, and 
received lO.Sl percent of the total monthly net tenant benefits. 
2. Tenants with monthly incomes greater than SO and.less than or 
equal to 7S Libyan Dinars represented 32.19 percent of the total number 
of tenants, had 28.02 percent of the total monthly income, and received 
29.12 percent of the total monthly net tenant benefits. 
3. Tenants with monthly incomes greater.than.7S and· less than. or 
equal to 100 Libyan Dinars represented 42.34 percent of the total number 
.. 
of tenants, had Sl.68 percent of the total monthly income, and received 





25 -+ 50 
Income 
50 -+ 75 
Income 
75 -+ 100 
Income 
101 and more 
TABLE XVI 
DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL MONTHLY NET TENANT BENEFITS FROM THE INTEREST FREE 
LOANS PROGRAM SAMPLE AMONG INCOME CLASSES OF TENANTS 
Total Monthly Percentage of 
Percentage of Net Tenant Total Monthly Total Monthly 
No. of Total No. of Benefits in Net Tenant Income in· Percentage of Total 
Observations Observations L.D. ;Benefits L.D. Monthly Income 
640 100% 6101.2206 100% 46078.7000 100% 
129 20.16% 641.2712 10.51% 5531.0000 12% 
-
206 . 32.19% 1776.7305 29.12% 12910.2500 28.02% 
271 42.34% 3165.5775 51.89% 23810.7500 51.68% 




4. Tenants with monthly incomes greater than 100 Libyan Dinars 
represented 5.31 percent of the total number of tenants, had 8.30 per-
cent of the total monthly income, and received 8.48 percent of the 
total monthly net tenant benefits. 
From these numbers we can say that monthly net tenant benefits are 
positively correlated with monthly tenant incomes, as incomes increase 
net tenant benefits increase. As we can see from the table the income 
class that has the highest percentage of income also has the highest 
percentage of net tenant benefits. 
From Table XVI, also, we can judge this. program in terms of serving 
the income classes that it was mainly designed for. As was mentioned 
before, this program was designed mainly to serve people with monthly 
incomes within the range of 50 to 100 Libyan Dinars. From the analysis 
I 
in Table XVI we find that these people represented approximately 74.53 
percent of the total number of tenants, and received 81.01 percent of 
the total monthly net tenant benefits. Based on these numbers, we can 
say that the interest free loans program had fairly well served the in-
come classes it was designed for. 
Distribution of Total Monthly Net Tenant 
Benefits from the Interest Free Loans 
Program According to Family Size 
This distribution is shown in Table XVII. Even though the distribu-
tion in the·table is made for all family sizes, separately we are going 
to add up all the families with sizes less than or equal to six in one 
group and all the families with sizes greater than six in another group 
and compare these two groups with each other. 
Classification 
Total sample 
FZ = 1 
FZ = 2 
FZ = 3 
FZ = 4 
FZ = 5 
FZ = 6 
FZ = 7 
FZ = 8 
FZ = 9 
FZ = 10 
FZ = 11 
FZ = 12 
FZ = 18 
TABLE XVII 
DISTcRIBUTION OF TOTAL MONTHLY NET TENANT BENEFITS FROM THE INTEREST FREE 
LOANS PROGRAM ACCORDING TO FAMILY SIZE 
Total Monthly Percentage of 
Percentage of Net Tenant Total Monthly Total Monthly 
No. of Total No. of Benefits in Net Tenant Income.in Percentage of Total 
Observations Observations L.D. Benefits L.D. Monthly Income 
640 100% 6101.2206 100% 46078.7000 100% 
15 2.34% 134.8471 2.21% 1134.5000 2.46% 
72 11.25% 778.7381 12.76% 5399.0000 11.72% 
92 14.37% 938.3827 15.38% 9666.6000 15.12% 
96 15.00% 954.0092 15.64% 7083.0000 15.37% 
90 14.06% 864.4175 14.17% 6457.5000 14.01% 
83 12.97% 694.6474 11.39% 5612.2500 12.18% 
73 11.41% 674.4914 11.06% 5193.3500 11.27% 
53 8.28% 470.7418 7. 72% 3743.7500 8.13% 
38 5.94% 340.6482 5.58% 2554.5000 5.54% 
19 2.97% 168.0539 2.75% 1300.7500 2.82% 
5 0.78% 42.4566 0.69% 303.5000 0.66% 
3 0.47% 27.0222 0.44% 205.0000 0.45% 






Following this classification we find that families with six members 
or less represent 69.99 percent of the total number of participating 
families, had 70.86 percent of the total monthly income, and received 
71.55 percent of the total monthly net tenant benefits attained by all 
participating families in the sample. 
Families with more than six members represented 30.01 percent of 
the total number of participating families, had 29.14 percent of the 
total monthly income, and received 28.45 percent of the total monthly 
net tenant benefits received by all families in the sample. 
From these statistics there appears to be an indication that the 
distribution of net tenant benefits in this program among tenant families 
of different size is favoring smaller size families to larger size ones. 
However, a Z test showed this difference not to be significant (Z = 
0.6135, p > .05). 
Distribution of Total Monthly Net Tenant 
Benefits from the Interest Free Loans 
Program According to the Age of the 
Head of 'the Family 
For the purpose of this analysis tenants are divided into five 
I 
classes of families: (1) families headed by persons with age less than 
or equal to 30 years, (2) famili~s headed by persons with age greater 
than 30, but less than or equal to 40 years, (3) families headed by 
p:ersons with age greater than 40, but less than or equal to 50 years, 
(4) families headed by persons with age greater than 50, but less than 
or equal to 60 years, and (5) families headed by persons with age greater 
than 60 years. 
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The distribution of total monthly net tenant benefits according to 
this classification is shown in Table XVIII. From that table we find 
the following statistics: 
1. Families headed with persons with age less than or equal to 30 
years represent 21.88 percent of the total number of participating 
families, had 23.58 percent of the total monthly income, and received 
24.65 percent of the total monthly net tenant benefits. 
2. Families headed by persons with age greater than 30 and less 
than or equal to 40 years represent 42.34 percent of the total number 
of participating families, had 43.83 percent of the total monthly 
income, and received 43.86 percent of the total monthly net tenant 
benefits. 
3. Families headed by persons with age greater than 40, and less 
than or equal to 50 years represented 22.34 percent of the total 
number of participating families, had 21.15 percent of the total 
monthly income, and received 20.60 percent of the total monthly net 
tenant benefits. 
4. Families headed by persons with age greater than 50, and less 
than or equal to 60 years represented 9.06 percent of the total number 
of participating families, had 7.72 percent of the total monthly in-
come, and received 7.44 percent of the total monthly net tenant 
benefits. 
5. Families headed by persOllS with age greater than 60 years 
represented 4.38 percent of the.total number of p~rticipating families, 
had J.72 percent of the total monthly income, and received 3.45 percent 
of the total monthly net tenant benefits. 
Classification 
All sample 
Age ..::_ 30 
30 < age ..::_ 40 
40 < age ..::_ 50 
50 < age ..::_ 60 
Age > 60 
TABLE XVIII 
DISTRIBUTION OF MONTHLY NET TENANT BENEFITS FROM THE INTEREST FREE 
LOANS PROGRAM AMONG AGE CLASSES 
Total Monthly Percentage of 
Percentage of Net Tenant Total Monthly Total Monthly 
No. of Total No. of Benefits in Net Tenant Income in Percentage of Total 
Observations Observations L.D. Benefits L.D. Monthly_ Income 
640 100% 6101.2206 100% 46078.7000 100% 
140 21.88% 1504.0558 24.65% 10863.5000 23.58% 
271 42.34% 2675.6749 43.85% 20195.5000 43.83% 
143 22.34% 1257.0161 20.60% 9745.4500 21.15% 
58 9.06% 454.0525 7.44% 3558.2500 7. 72% 





From these statistics it can be noticed that tenant families headed 
by relatively younger persons are in more favorable conditions in terms 
of net tenant benefits than tenant ·families headed with relatively 
older tenants. 
Regression Analysis and its Results 
Regression Analysis 
After the total and average monthly net tenant benefits from both 
housing programs were calculated, a linear regression analysis was 
applied to both housing programs to help answer the questions. In that 
regression analysis, net tenant benefits were put as a function of 
tenant's actual monthly income, tenant's family size, and age of the 
head of the tenant's family. The function was of the following form: 
where 
B f(Y , FZ, G) 
0 
B net tenant benefits, 
Y tenant's actual income, 
0 
FZ = tenant's family size, and 
G = age of the head of the family. 





a 2 = family size coefficient 
a3 = a~e coefficient 
and E is the error term. 
Results of the Regression Analysis f.or 
th~ Sample from the Publicly Built 
Housing Program 
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The results of this regression are shown in the upper part of 
Table XIX, equations 1 through 3. Equation (1) shows the results of 
relating monthly net tenant benefits to monthly tenant's actual income, 
tenant's family size, and age of the head of the family, when all 
tenants in the sample are included. 
From that equation we find that net tenant benefits are negatively 
related with income, and positively related with both family size and 
age. Results which tend to correspond to most people's expectations 
of this type of housing programs. Most people would expect that 
tenants with relatively lower income should benefit more from public 
housing programs than tenants with relatively higher income. Also, no 
one probably will object if larger families benefited more by public 
housing programs than smaller families, since it seems logical to help 
larger families more than smaller families, our results in equ~tion (1) 
seem to go along with these reasonings. With respect to .the relation-
ship between net tenant benefits artd age of the head of the. family the 
results in equation (1) support the idea that senior citizens should 
receive more support from public housing programs than relatively 
younger citizens. 
TABLE XIX 
REGRESSION EQUATIONS FOR THE SAMPLES FROM BOTH 
HOUSING PROGRAMS6 
Sample from the Publicly Built Housing Program 
(1) Benefit * . = 48.36 - 0.24 income+ 0.18 FZ + 0.027 Age 
(-13.01) (1.01) (0.77) 
R2 = 0.226 
(2) Benefit * * *** 27.397 + 0.15 income+ 0.56 FZ + 0.029 Age 
(11.62) (6.37) (1.799) 2 
R 0.245 
(3) L Benefit * * ** = 2.43 + 0.25 L income + 0.085 L FZ + 0.038 L Age 
(14.73) (6.96) (1.99~ 
R 0.33 
Sample from the Interest Free Loans Housing Program 
(4) Benefit ' . * = 0.2535 + 0.142 income - 0.059 FZ - 0.015 Age 
(23.52) (-1.01) (-1.12) 2 
R 0.493 
(5) L Benefit * = -2.563 + 1.175 L income - 0.043 L FZ - 0.055 L Age 
(26.82) (-1.43) (-0.88) 
R2 = 0.558 
6 The numbers in parentheses are the t ratios. 
* Significant at the .o. 01 level. 
** Significant at the 0.05 level. 
*** Significant at the 0.10 level. 
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Equation (2) shows the relationship between net tenant benefits, 
tenant's actual income, tenant's family size, and age of the head of the 
7 
family, when tenants with rent allowance are excluded from the sample. 
As can be seen from Table XIX the results in equation (2) are different 
from the results in equation (1) in the following respects: 
1. The income coefficient has changed its sign from negative to 
positive, indicating that net tenant benefits are positively related 
with income (which means that tenants with relatively higher incomes are 
benefiting more from this housing program than tenants with relatively 
lower incomes). This result will not go with what most of the people 
would expect and it needs to be explained. 
2. Even though the coeffici~nts of family size and age came with 
the same signs as in equation (1) they appeared to be more significant 
in the second case than in the first one. 
Equation (3) is the log form of equation (2). As we can see, using 
the log form has increased the significance of all variables, 
especially the income variable as it is clear from comparing the t 
ratios (the number in parentheses). It also resulted in a relatively 
higher R2 • 
Results of Regression Analysis for the 
Sample from the Interest Free Loans 
Program 
These results are shown by equations (4) and (5) in the lower part 
7There are 52 tenants with rent allowances in the sample from the 
publicly built housing program. 
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of Table XIX. Equation (4) shows the results of relating net tenant 
benefits from the interest free loans program to tenant's actual 
income, tenant's family size, and age of the head of the family. 
Equation (5) gives the same relationship in the log form. 
From equation (4) we can notice the following: 
1. Income came out with a positive coefficient indicating that 
tenant benefits are positively related with tenant's income. In other 
words, tenants with relatively higher income tend to benefit more from 
interest free loans than tenants with relatively lower income. 
2. On the other hand, both family size and age of the head of the 
family came out with negative coefficients indicating that net tenant 
benefits seem to decline as family size and age of the head of the 
family increases. This means that larger families tend to benefit less 
from interest free loans than smailer families, and families headed by 
older tenants benefit less than families headed by younger tenants. 
From equation (5) we notice that all variables came out with the 
' same sign as in equation (4) except that they became more significant. 
Also, in equation (5) we find that Rz is higher than it was in equation 
( 4) • 
The Questions and Their Answers 
As it was mentioned in Chapter I, ,one of the main purposes of this 
study was to provide answers ~o t~e following questions: 
1. Do the two programs provide the same average monthly net tenant 
benefits, and the same benefit-subsidy ratio? 
2. How are the net tenant benefits.in each program related to 
tenant's actual income? 
3. How are net tenant benefits in each program related with 
tenant's family size? 
4. How are net tenant benefits in each program related to the 
age of the head of the t~riant's family? 
128 
The ariswers to these questions are not as simple as the questions 
themselves, and even more sadly, they are not entirely clear cut with 
the exception o~ question one. 
With respect to question numb_er one, it is clear from our calcula-
tions of net tenant benefits that' publicly built housing program offers 
higher average monthly net tenant benefits than does the interest free 
loans program. According to the calculations the average monthly net 
tenant benefits from the publicly built housing program is equal to 
L.D. 36.7662 while the average monthly net tenant benefits from the 
interest free loans program is equal to L.D. 9.5332. It is clear that 
the average monthly net tenant benefits from the publicly built housing 
program is approximately four times the average monthly net tenant 
benefits from the interest free loaps program. In terms of net tenant 
benefits-tenant subsidy ratio, the publicly built housing program is 
also better than the interest free loans program, its ratio is 0.92 
while the interest free loans program's ratiq is only 0.72. 
The answer to the second question is not very clear cut. It is 
very hard to be assured whether n~t tenant benefits are positively or 
negatively related with the tenant's actual income. As can be seen from 
the regression equations in Table XIX, two possible answers can be given 
to that question. Considering equation (1) we say that net tenant 
benefits are negatively related with the tenant's actual income. On the 
other hand if we base our answer on the other equations, we say that 
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the net tenant benefits are positively related with the tenant's actual 
income. In all cases the coefficient of the income term is highly 
significant at the 0.01 level. There are no priori bases to support 
whether net tenant benefits should be positively or negatively related 
with the tenant's actual income. To find the reasons behind the changes 
in the sign of income term, the following explanations are developed: 
1. In regression equation (1) the program rent for the tenants 
with rent allowance is the rent allowance itself. As it was explained 
in Chapter III, this rent allowance is formulated in such a way that it 
increases as income increases. This means that the program rent for 
this gro~p is positively related with their income. The higher the 
income, the higher the program rent. As program rent increases, 
other things equal, tenant subsidy and tenant benefits decline. Net 
tenant benefits for this group are negatively related with their actual 
incomes. This probably had affected the result for the whole sample, 
and forced income to come out with a negative sign. 
2. The program rent for the other tenants in the sample is not 
proportional to their incomes. It does not increase as income in-
creases. It is based on the number of rooms and probably family size 
and not on income. Most of the tenants in the publicly built housing 
program are roughly paying the same program rent. So, if tenants with 
roughly the same family size and same number of rooms, but with dif-
ferent incomes were charged the same program rent, then it is logical 
to find that the tenant with relatively higher income benefited more 
than the tenant with relatively lower income. 
To make sure that families with lower incomes receive higher 
benefits, other things equal, the program has to impose higher program 
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rents on higher income families, that means program rent has to increase 
as income increases. This is not the way in the case of the publicly 
built housing program in the Libyan Arab Republic (with the exception 
of tenants with rent allowance). A regression of the program rent (Rp) 
against income and constant showed that (Rp) is hardly correlated with 
income. 
3. With respect to the case of the interest free loans program, 
the explanation for the positive sign of the income term is that tenants 
with relatively high income have more opportunity to get bigger loans 
than tenants with relatively lower income because they can afford higher 
monthly payments. Since the subsidy is the interest charges on the 
loan, then bigger loans offer higher subsidies and then higher benefits. 
The answer to the third question differs from one program to 
another. With respect to the publicly built housing program, as can be 
seen from equations (1), (2) and (3) in Table XIX, net tenant benefits 
are positively related with family size. That means net tenant benefits 
increase as family size increases. In equations (2) and (3), the coef-
ficient of the family size term is significant at the 0.01 level, but 
in equation (1) it is not significant at the conventional levels. With 
respect to the interest free loans program, on the other hand, net 
tenant benefits are negatively related with family size as it is clear 
from equations (4) and (5) in Table XIX. Considering the significance 
level we find that the coefficient of the family size term in both 
equations is not significant at the conventional levels. 
The answer to the fourth question is also not clear and depends on 
whether we are talking about the publicly built housing program or the 
interest free loans program. In the publicly built housing program, 
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net tenant .benefits seem to be positively related with the age of the 
head of the tenant family as it is clear from equations (1), (2) and 
(3) in Table XIX. In equation (1) the coefficient of the age term is 
not significant at the conventional levels. In equation (2) it is 
significant at the 0,10 level, and in equation (3) it is significant at 
the 0.05 level. 
With regard to the interest free loans program, net tenant benefits 
appear to be negatively related to the age of the head of the family in 
both equations (4) and (5) in Table XIX. In both equations, the coef-
ficient of the age term is not sfgnificant at the conventional levels. 
To test for the.milticollinearitybetween the variables (tenant's 
income, family size, and age of the head of the family) a correlation 
matrix for each program is produced in Table XX. From these correlation 
matrices there is no sign of multicollinearity between these variables. 
Summary 
This chapter has provided estim~tes of net tenant benefits and 
tenant subsidies from the two main housing programs in the Libyan Arab 
·Republic, namely the public built housing program and the interest 
fre~ loans program; Totals and means of the net tenant benefits and 
tenant subs~dies from each program were calculated. A comparison 
between the 'two programs in terms of mean monthly net tenant benefits 
and net tenant benefits-tenant subsidy ratio showed that the publicly 
built housing program offers higher mean monthly net tenant benefits 
and higher net tenant benefits-tenant subsidy ratio than the interest 
free loans program. The distribution of net .. ,tenant. benefits among the 
tenants by income, family size, and age of the head ~f the family was 
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TABLE XX 
CORRELATION MATRICES FOR BOTH SAMPLES 
Income FZ Age Benefit 
Correlation Matrix for the Sample from the 
Interest Free Loans Program 
Income 1. 000000 -0.098689 -0.255199 0.699901 
0.0000 0.0125 0.0001 0.0001 
FZ -0.098689 1.000000 0.495262 -0.119396 
0.0125 0.0000 0.0001 0.0025 
Age -0.255199 0.495262 1.000000 -0.229308 
0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 
Benefit 0.699901 -0.119396 -0.229308 1.000000 
0.0001 0.0025 0.0001 0.0000 
Correlation Matrix for the Sample from the 
Publicly Built Housing-Program 
Income 1.000000 0.008955 -0.109664 0.427002 
0.0000 0.8331 0.0097 0.0001 
FZ 0.008955 1.000000 0.080396 0.245769 
0.8331 0.0000 0.0582 0.0001 
Age -0.109664 -0.080396 1.000000 0.387840 
0.0097 0.0582 0.0000 0.3613 
Benefit 0.427002 0.245769 0.387840 1.000000 
0.0001 0.0001 0.3613 0.0000 
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discussed for both programs. A regression analysis relating net tenant 
benefits to tenant's income, family size, and age of the head of the 
family was performed for both programs. From the analysis it was found 
that net tenant benefits (if the people with rent allowance in the 
sampl~ from the publicly built housing program were excluded) are 
positively related with tenant's income in both programs. Net tenant 
benefits are positively related with both family size and age of the 
head of the family in the publicly built housing program, and 
negatively related with both of them in the interest free loans program. 
Based on these results this chapter has provided answers to the study 
questions. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Public housing programs have been adopted by almost every country 
fer different reasons. The Libyan Arab Republic is no exception. For 
various reasons several housing programs adopted and initiated. This 
study has provided data sources and an analysis of specific benefits 
for the two main housing programs, namely the publicly built housing 
program and the interest free .loans program. The purpose has been to 
evaluate and compare them in terms of the net tenant benefits they 
provide to their tenants, and .of the distribution of these tenant 
benefits among tenants according to such family characteristics as 
income, family size, and age of the head of the family• 
This chapter is concerned with presenting specific conclusions of 
the analysis and some policy recommendations. The conclusions include: 
(1) tenant benefits and subsidies in each program, (2) the distribution 
of net tenant benefits, (3) the relationship between net tenant benefits, 
tenant's income, family size and age of the head ·of the family. Finally, 
this chapter concludes with policy recommendations which might help 




Tenant Benefits and Subsidies 
Using the research methodology presented in Chapter IV, the study 
has calculated net tenant benefits and tenant subsidies for both 
programs. Totals and means of monthly net benefits and subsidies for 
the tenants in the samples from both programs are presented in Table XI. 
Based on these calculated benefits and subsidies, the study has reached 
the conclusion that the publicly built; housing program has provided its 
tenants with higher mean mont;hly net tenant benefits than the interest 
free loans program. The mean benefits were 36.7662 and 9.5332 Libyan 
I 
Dinars, respectively. In terms of net tenant benefits-tenant subsidy 
ratio, the publicly built housing program also turned out to be 
superior to the interest free loans program. Its ratio amounted to 
0.92, while the ratio for the interest free loans program was only 
0. 72. 
Distribution of Net Tenant Benefits 
In addition to the calculation of totals and means of net tenant 
benefits in each program, the distribution of these net tenant benefits 
among tenants of different income classes, family sizes, and ages of the 
head of the tenant families was ,produced for both programs. From that 
distribution the following conclusion's are drawn: 
1. Considering the distribution of net tenant benefits among 
tenants of different income classes, it was found that 92.81 percent of 
the total monthly net tenant benefits from the publicly built housing 
program are received by tenants with monthly income of 75 Libyan Dinars 
or less, and only 7.19 percent of the monthly benefits are received by 
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tenants with monthly income higher than 7S Libyan Dinars. 
With respect to the interest free loans program 81.01 percent of 
the total monthly net tenant benefit's are received by tenants with 
monthly income ranging from SO to 100 Libyan Dinars, and 18.99 percent 
are received by tenants with monthly income either less than SO or 
greater than 100 Libyan Dinars. 
2. With'regard to the distribution of net tenant benefits among 
tenants of different family sizes we find that 67.S2 percent of the 
total monthly net tenant benefits provided by the publicly built housing 
.program goes to tenant families ~ith family sizes of six persons or 
less, and 32.48 percent of thos,e benefits go to tenant families with 
family sizes of more than six persons. 
With respect to the distribution of net tenant benefits from the 
interest free loans program among tenant families of different sizes we 
find that 7l.SS percent of the.benefits goes to tenant families of 
sizes of six persons or less, and 28.4S percent of that benefit goes 
to tenant families with family sizes of more than six persons. 
3. From the point of view of the distribution of net tenant 
benefits among tenant families ac~ording to the age of the head of the 
family, this study found that 11.93 percent of the total monthly net 
tenant benefits from the publicly built housing program goes to tenant 
families headed by individuals less than 30 years old, 31.42 percent 
goes to tenant families headed by individuals aging between 30 and 40 
years old, 27.37 percent goes to families headed by individuals aging 
between 40 and SO years, 18.03 percent goes to families headed by 
individuals aging from SO to 60 years, and 11.2S percent goes to families 
headed by individuals older than 60 years. 
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With respect to the net tenant benefits from the interest free 
loans program, the distribution was: 24.65 percent goes to tenant 
families headed by individuals with age not more than 30 years, 43.86 
percent goes to tenant families headed by individuals aging between 30 
and 40 years, 20.60 percent goes to tenant families headed by indi-
viduals aging between 40 and 50 years, 7.44 percent goes to tenant 
families headed by individuals aging between 50 and 60 years, and 3.45 
percent goes to tenant families headed by individuals aging more than 
60 years .. 
Net Tenant Benefits as a Function of Tenant 
Income, Family Size, and Age·of the 
Head of the Family 
To determine these relationships, a linear regression analysis was 
performed for both samples. From the results of that regression we come 
up with the following conclusions: 
1. It was found that net tenant benefits are positively related 
with the tenant's actual income in both programs except in the case or 
regression equation (1) in Table XIX where the tenants with rent 
allowance were included in the sample from the publicly built housing 
program. In all cases coefficient of the income, term 1<ras highly signif-
icant at the 0.01 level. This result means that tenant benefit's in both 
programs increase as tenant's actual income increases. In other words, 
tenant families with relatively high incomes are benefiting more thi:m 
tenant families with relatively low incomes in both programs. 
2. With respect .to the relationship between net tenant benefits 
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and tenant family size it was found that net tenant benefits are 
positively related with family size in the sample from the publi~ly 
built housing program, but it is negatively related with family size in 
the sample.from the interest free loans program. That means larger 
·size families are relatively benefiting more from the publicly built 
housing program than smaller size families., but in the interest free 
loans program smaller size families are relatively benefiting more. 
3. Referring to the regression results in Table XIX we can 
contlude that net tenant benefits are positively related with the age of 
the head of the family in the publicly .built housing program, and 
negatively related with the age of the head of the family in the 
interest free loans program. 
Policy Recommendations 
Considering the results of this study, the following policy recom-
mendations are formulated. It is thought that these policy recommenda-
tions, if followed, will help increase the efficiency of both housing 
programs in achieving their purposes. These policy recoffimendatidns are: 
1. One of the purposes of these housing programs is to help 
people with relatively low income. Also, based on equity concerns which 
believed to be behind the racionale for subsidy programs persons with 
relatively low income should receive larger benefits as they are in 
greater need. From the analysis of this study it was found that the net 
tenant benefits are positively: related to the tenant's actua~ income, 
which means that within the low income population, tenants with 
relatively high income are benefiting more from these housing programs, 
while it should be the other way around. To make sure that tenant 
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families with relatively low income will receive more benefits than 
tenant families with relatively high income it is recommended that in 
both programs we should be sure that the relatively low income families 
be subsidized more. We have to make tenant families with relatively 
high income pay more for housing than the relatively low income 
families. To do that we have to rna~ the program rent in the publicly 
built housing program increase as income increases. That means 
relatively high income families should pay relatively high program rents 
and vice versa. For the interest free loans program it is recommended 
that the program should give the relatively low income people (within 
its tenants) more advantages such as, making their loans include the 
land purchase, extending the mortgage period for them and so on. 
2. Based on equity concerns also, larger size families should 
I 
receive more housing than smaller ones (and perhaps should receive more 
benefits since there are more persons, mostly dependents, in such 
families). So if there are two families with the same income, but with 
different family size, the larger size family should be helped more. 
Larger size family here represents more population, and per capita 
income for this family is lower than per capita income for the smaller 
size family. Instead of taking the total income of the family as our 
criteria we should take the per capita income for the family. A low 
income family may not be considered so on per capita basis. In effect 
the family size and its effect, on per capita income for the family 
should be taken into consideration in <;ietermining who is eligible for 
these housing programs and who is not. Our analysis has showed that net 
tenant benefits from the interest free loans program are negatively 
related to the family size wh~ch means that larger size families are 
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benefiting less from this program than smaller size families, a result 
which does not correspond to the equity criteria mentioned above, and 
does not seem to go along with the Libyan population policy which 
encourages population increase in many ways. Based on these reasons 
it is recommended that larger size families should be helped and sup-
ported more than smaller size families especially if the income 
criteria is met. 
3. Equity concern also requites that elderly households receive 
greater benefits since they hold a distinguished position in the 
society. From our analysis it was found that net tenant benefits from 
the interest free loans program are negatively related to the age of 
the head of the family, which means that tenant families headed with 
relatively older people received less benefits than tenant families 
headed with relatively younger people. So it is reconnnended here that 
tenant families headed with relati~ely older people should be given 
more advantages and more favor,ite treatment than what they are receiving 
now in order to make them benefit more. 
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